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1          Introduction 
In 1983, a panel of distinguished educators assembled by Secretary of Education 
Terrence Bell—the National Commission on Excellence in Education— released a report 
on the condition of American education entitled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform. The provocative tone of the report asserted that “if an unfriendly 
foreign power” had tried “to impose on America the mediocre educational performance” 
of our schools, we might have regarded it as “an act of war” (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education [NCEE], 1983). The memorable language of the opening pages 
synthesized the Commission’s findings:  a “rising tide of mediocrity” has overtaken our 
schools and “threatens our very future as a Nation and a people” (NCEE, 1983). These 
words set off a wave of local, state, and federal reform efforts which continue today. 
The volume and pace of education reform in America increased dramatically as A 
Nation at Risk and a myriad of other studies made a strong case for the urgency of such 
reforms. State and local policymakers, largely in response to federal grant-matching 
initiatives such as No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top, have been rethinking a vast 
array of education policies and have heightened public awareness of these issues. Since A 
Nation at Risk first portrayed the dismal scene of American education, a debate over how 
to ‘fix’ America’s schools has ensued amongst teachers, parents, administrators, 
researchers, and policymakers. A lack of consensus has inspired a diverse cast of 
reformers and a disjointed vision of reform remains. Increasingly, as alternative teacher 
certification and evaluation programs, accountability measures and stricter standards, and 
unconventional school structures such as the charter school movement have gained 
traction, education issues have come to the forefront of national attention. A 
reconsideration of tenure laws and teacher compensation structures have accompanied 
this host of other reforms. 
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Although politicians take stances on the policies discussed herein such as teacher 
tenure, accountability for student outcomes, and school choice, this thesis examines 
teachers’ own attitudes regarding these initiatives. The extent of teacher support for 
certain policies is important to study as many gripe that educators have been excluded 
from the biggest debates over laws affecting America’s classrooms. Measuring teachers’ 
opinions is crucial as education reform groups take their policies to statehouses claiming 
a groundswell of educator support. Teachers, as both classroom implementers of public 
policy and as political actors, help determine the real impact of changes in education 
policy. In this climate of reform, teacher buy-in and teachers union cooperation is critical 
to implementation. 
The majority of proposed reforms fall into one of three related, yet distinguishable 
categories: teacher tenure rules, teacher accountability for student outcomes, and school 
choice. The broad spectrum of education reform initiatives considered in this thesis have 
been studied by many social scientists. However, one area that has not been sufficiently 
studied is the idea of how teacher training shapes teachers’ attitudes about these 
education reform policies. Specifically, does the quality of a teacher’s undergraduate 
institution have an impact on their support for school reform and if so, how? 
This question is particularly relevant given researchers’ concerns about the overall 
quality of today’s teaching workforce. Students majoring in education tend to be drawn 
from the lower end of the academic aptitude distribution, as measured by standardized 
test scores on the SAT and ACT (Murnane, Singer, Willett, Kemple, & Olsen, 2009). In 
Who Will Teach?, Murnane et al. write that “college graduates with high test scores are 
less likely to take [teaching] jobs, employed teachers with high test scores are less likely 
to stay, and former teachers with high test scores are less likely to return” (p. 10). Ballou, 
Dale, and Podgursky (1998) lend further evidence to this conclusion, suggesting that on 
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average, the higher the quality of an individual’s undergraduate institution, the less likely 
a student is to choose a teaching career. More recently, a number of studies have 
examined the teacher training question in terms of training’s impact on teaching 
effectiveness and student achievement. Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) and Kane, Rockoff, 
and Staiger (2008) find that individual teachers have a profound and lasting impact on 
their students’ learning. 
Chapter 3 will continue the conversation about the distribution of academic ability 
in teaching and the quality of teacher training by estimating the relationship between the 
quality of a teacher’s undergraduate institution and, not student achievement, but a 
teacher’s own views on education reform. In Chapter 4, political science theory is used to 
contextualize the empirical results in the framework of teachers unions’ political agendas 
and teachers’ satisfaction with their unions. My analysis builds off of Moe (2011) who 
used the Brookings Institution’s 2003 Survey of Educators to find that teachers unions 
protect ineffective teachers and more generally block education reform that could 
potentially improve schooling.1 
Using the same dataset, I add to many of Moe’s results by looking specifically at 
the quality of pre-service teacher training as a predictor of these attitudes. The 
undergraduate institution the teacher attended is therefore the main explanatory variable 
of interest in this study while the key areas of reform are (1) teachers’ likelihood to 
support a tenure elimination in exchange for a salary increase proposal, (2) teachers’ 
likelihood to support accountability for student outcomes, (3) teachers’ likelihood to 
support merit pay, (4) teachers’ likelihood to support charter schools, and finally (5) 
                                                 
1 Moe has a reputation as a strong conservative and firm advocate of education reform, especially teacher 
tenure and school choice. His partnership with the left-leaning think tank, The Brookings Institute, to 
conduct the Survey of Educators, however, provides complete confidence in the validity of the data 
collected. 
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teachers’ likelihood to support private school vouchers for disadvantaged kids. Overall, 
the empirical results support the idea that teacher training affects teacher opinions on 
education reform policies. In particular, teachers who trained at top-tier universities in 
undergrad tend to be more supportive of education reforms concerning tenure 
elimination, accountability for student outcomes, merit pay, and, to some extent, charter 
schools compared to teachers who were trained at second-tier universities.  
 
1.1 Political Socialization—Why Study Teacher Training? 
Since where an individual attends college is correlated with their family’s 
financial background, one might claim that teacher training actually has little effect on 
teachers’ attitudes about education policy. Rather, teachers who grew up in a working 
class family who are likely to have a stronger affinity for unions are also more likely to 
go to a second-tier university close to home whereas individuals from higher income 
families are much more likely to attend a top-tier university. Furthermore, it is likely that 
the meaning of professionalism is understood differently by these contrasting groups. To 
second-tier university teachers, professionalism may be understood as possessing an 
advanced certification or working within a professional organization such as a union. 
Conversely, to top-tier university graduates, professionalism is more likely defined as 
being held accountable for one’s work and being rewarded for excellent performance. 
These non-training factors certainly have an influence on a teacher’s beliefs about 
education policy that is relevant and important, but they do not tell the full story. A wide 
body of political science research has been dedicated to studying political socialization: 
the process through which an individual acquires his or her political orientation using 
knowledge, feeling, and evaluations of the political world. This research has 
demonstrated that political attitudes are shaped by a combination of factors including 
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one’s family, school, peers, and the mass media as well as other less important influences 
such as race, gender, age, religion, geographic region, and income class (Hyman, 1959; 
Dawson & Prewitt, 1969; Easton & Dennis, 1980; Langton, 1969; Lyons, 2017). 
Despite the influence of early socialized pressure from family members, 
longitudinal research studies have found they may not persist over time. That is, political 
socialization is an iterative process and the political environments one encounters 
throughout their lifespan exert a significant influence by moderating or reinforcing the 
persistence of early forces. For instance, once children leave the bubble of the family 
home and venture out into the world, the influence of early parental socialization can be 
offset and nullified by the political environment citizens reside in such as the political 
composition of their town or their spouse’s views which become increasingly important 
in determining an individual’s political identity (Lyons, 2017). 
Like any political attitude, teachers’ attitudes about education policy are shaped 
by a combination of factors including the society they grew up in, their familial 
background, their pre-service training, their in-service training, as well as demographic 
characteristics. While no single feature of a teacher’s life is able to explain all of their 
attitudes about education reform policies, this point does not in itself discount the 
connection drawn between the quality of undergraduate teacher training as one of several 
important elements in predicting these attitudes. Considering that colleges of education 
are responsible for preparing teachers for the classroom in many ways, it is sensible that 
the quality of this instruction has an important impact on the way that teachers think 
about the school system and the policies they choose to support.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the 
education reform policies examined; Chapter 3 details the dependent and independent 
variables used, formally introduces the models and expectations, and presents, interprets, 
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and discusses the empirical results. Chapter 4 describes the reasons for the discrepancy in 
political attitudes between certain teachers and their unions; Chapter 5 concludes the 
thesis. 
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2 Education Reform Policies 
 This chapter will give a thorough review of the education reform proposals that 
will serve as the dependent variables in the empirical work, define what these policies 
are, where and how they have been implemented, and what prior research has revealed 
about teachers’ opinions on these issues. The five different policies examined—teacher 
tenure, accountability, merit pay, charter schools and private school vouchers—are 
discussed in three sections with the interconnected topics of accountability and merit pay 
lumped together, school choice reforms charter schools and private school vouchers 
combined, and teacher tenure as a standalone topic. 
 
2.1 Teacher Tenure 
The tenure system has been a controversial issue since its inception, but lately 
discussions of eliminating or revising teacher tenure have become a pressing political 
issue covered by the media. Politicians are voicing their opinions about the efficacy of 
the tenure system and although each state handles the policy slightly differently, recent 
high-profile legislative battles in states like New Jersey, and Ohio have elevated tenure 
reform to be prominent in the public eye. Paired with strong evidence that shows 
differences in individual teachers can have profound effects on student achievement, 
teacher tenure has taken center stage in the education reform movement. 
 
2.1.1 Definition. Teacher tenure refers to a policy which restricts the ability to 
fire teachers without a “just cause” and was initially created to shield teachers from 
arbitrary dismissal. Tenure at the K-12 level is considerably different than in higher 
education. Each state has established its own tenure system, but in most states tenure 
rules take a similar form. There is a probation period, typically 3 to 5 years, in which a 
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new teacher must prove he or she is deserving of tenure protection. Typically, the 
principal of the school or other administrators may fire the teacher at any point during the 
probationary period, but after a teacher is granted tenure he or she cannot be dismissed 
without just cause. In addition to stipulating the number of probationary years, tenure 
laws include the reasons a tenured teacher can be dismissed and the due process required 
in the event that a tenured teacher should require dismissal. Frequently, teachers unions 
negotiate contracts with additional due process rights which increase the burden on 
administrators to undertake dismissal proceedings (Moe, 2011).  
 
2.1.2 Criticism. The effort to reform tenure is driven primarily by critics’ belief 
that tenure laws perpetuate mediocrity by making it too difficult to fire ineffective 
teachers and thus shortchange students in classrooms with subpar teachers. Tenure laws 
impose lengthy and costly processes for dismissal involving multiple hearings and 
appeals in most states (Jupp, 2009). The National Center for Education Statistics reports 
that only 0.2% of tenured teachers are dismissed for poor performance (U.S. DoE, 2008). 
Some critics argue that tenure is given too readily and promote longer probationary 
periods and stricter teachers evaluations, claiming that under the current system tenure is 
more of a formality than an emblem of teacher effectiveness. Others argue that tenure is 
no longer necessary and ought to be eliminated completely due to the passage of labor 
laws that guard employees against discrimination and other employer abuses. Both 
moderate and extreme reformers believe that tenure is hurting American education. 
Tenure defenders, primarily teachers unions, argue that tenure provides vital 
protections for teachers against unjust dismissal and insist reformers’ claims it is nearly 
impossible to fire a tenured teacher for poor performance are untrue (Han, 2015). 
Moreover, tenure defenders claim that the assault on tenure is unfounded because 
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administrators have a responsibility to either provide more meaningful, multi-faceted, and 
individualized professional development for struggling teachers to help them improve or 
guide the worst teachers out of the profession early during the pre-tenure probationary 
period. 
 
2.1.3 Reform Efforts. Of specific interest for this study is a tenure elimination in 
exchange for a salary increase proposal. The most high-profile political battle concerning 
tenure elimination and salary increases to date occurred in the nation’s capital. In 2008, 
former chancellor of D.C. public schools, Michelle Rhee, designed a pay plan which 
would compensate teachers with substantial pay raises (to earn as much as $130,000 
annually) in exchange for voluntarily forgoing their tenure rights (Holland, 2010).2 The 
proposal was rejected by the teachers union which contested that some form of tenure 
was necessary to protect against arbitrary, political, or wrongful termination of 
employment, but in 2010 after extended negotiations Rhee and the American Federation 
of Teachers president Randi Weingarten agreed on a new contract that offered 20 percent 
pay raises and large bonuses of up to $30,000 for strong student achievement, in 
exchange for weakened teachers’ seniority protections and the end of tenure for one year. 
Under this agreement, Rhee fired 241 teachers who received underperforming 
evaluations and put hundreds of other school employees on notice (Holland, 2010). This 
divisive move achieved one of Rhee and her admirers’ long-held goals: to do away with 
what she calls “the dance of the lemons”—the shuffling of the worst-performing, union-
protected teachers between classrooms and schools. 
                                                 
2 In D.C. a teacher’s salary, on average, is less than $48,000; most first-year teachers make $32,000 
(Holland, 2010).   
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With No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top placing stiff penalties and 
significant rewards on student achievement and teacher effectiveness, tenure elimination 
gained popularity outside the District as well. State legislators began to look at teacher 
tenure as a barrier to achieving student proficiency required by 2014. Nineteen states 
modified their tenure laws for K-12 teachers in 2011 alone (Rosenberg & Silva, 2012). 
Florida, Idaho, and Mississippi have since eliminated tenure for new teachers entirely 
(Bruckmeyer, 2012; Duffett, Farkas, Rothertham, & Silva., 2008). These states have 
opted for requiring teachers to work on one-year or two-year contracts which are renewed 
on the basis of evaluations which are partially tied to student performance on assessment 
tests. Only minimal due process (notice and a hearing) is required before dismissing a 
teacher during the term of their contract in Florida and minimal due process is required 
before failing to renew a teacher’s contract in Mississippi or Idaho (Bruckmeyer, 2012). 
 
2.1.4 Prior Research. Research shows that teachers themselves believe the tenure 
system and contractual rules hinder quality by making it unduly difficult to remove 
persistently ineffective teachers. A 2008 Education Sector survey of over a 1,000 K-12 
public school teachers reports that “nearly half (46 percent)” of teachers “say they know a 
teacher in their own building who is past the probationary period but who is clearly 
ineffective and shouldn’t be in the classroom” (Duffett et al., p. 9). There is also evidence 
that teachers support lengthening probationary periods. According to a Gates/Scholastic 
survey, on average, teachers think it should take 5.4 years of teaching experience to earn 
tenure (in most states tenure is granted after 3 years or less) (Maier & Phillips, 2012). 
However, Duffett et al. (2008) find that teachers are reluctant to give up tenure in order to 
achieve other educational reforms. The Survey of Educators further supports that 
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conclusion, finding that in general, teachers are skeptical of relinquishing tenure rights 
entirely, even in exchange for substantial pay raises (See Table 1 Panel A). 
 
2.2 Accountability & Merit Pay 
Perhaps the fastest moving area of reform, teacher accountability for student 
achievement, has been brought on by a half century of evidence that existing evaluation 
systems are seriously flawed. In 1966 renowned sociologist of education and public 
policy James Coleman rocked public and scholarly opinion on schooling by showing that 
the quantity and quality of school inputs by way of funding, programs, and rules, have no 
reliable relationship to school outputs by way of student learning (Coleman, 1966). Yet, 
from the start accountability reform has been fraught with controversy over the question 
of how teacher effectiveness is best measured. Branded as standards-based reform, 
proponents claim that new teacher evaluation systems must be implemented to 
distinguish the good from the bad.3 
As a logical outgrowth of a body of research which has consistently identified 
teacher effectiveness as the most important in-school factor affecting student 
achievement, merit-pay or performance-pay for teachers has also gained popularity 
amongst reformers (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, & Hamilton, 2003; Hanushek, Kain, 
Markman, & Rivkin, 2000; Rowan, Correnti & Miller, 2002; Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 
1997). A rallying cry of the education reform movement, fueled by support from the 
Obama administration, has been that teachers ought to be judged, compensated, hired and 
fired based on their “effectiveness” on student learning. 
                                                 
3 In districts that use binary evaluation ratings (generally “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory”), more than 99 
percent of teachers receive the satisfactory rating. In districts that use a broader range of rating options, 94 
percent of teachers receive one of the top two ratings and less than 1 percent are rated unsatisfactory 
(Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, Keeling, Schunck, Palcisco, & Morgan, 2009). 
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2.2.1 Definitions. Accountability policies assert that taxpayer’s dollars should not 
just fund programs, but citizens should see results for their investment. In education 
policy circles, the term accountability is somewhat amorphous, but it generally means 
that schools (and more specifically teachers), should be held accountable for the progress 
(or lack thereof) in every student’s learning. Drawing a connection between the inputs of 
education and the output of student achievement requires a clearly defined set of 
standards, valid and reliable tests that measure how well students are meeting the 
standards, and an effective plan to improve the schools or teachers who are falling short. 
Proponents believe that accountability is necessary to identify and improve 
underperforming schools and teachers in order to ensure that all children are receiving a 
quality educational experience. 
The related concept of merit pay or pay-for-performance refers to any system in 
which compensation is partly based on an evaluation of a teacher's job performance, 
rather than seniority. The evaluation may be based on measurable factors such as value 
added changes in student test scores, subjective factors such as supervisory judgment or 
peer review, or some combination of each. Merit pay increases may take the form of a 
one-time performance bonus, a salary increase, or advancement on the district salary 
schedule. Proponents believe that merit pay can result in better student outcomes, 
improve teacher retention rates, and attract talented teachers to low-performing schools. 
The alternative to a merit pay system is the status quo single salary pay schedule used in 
most school districts. This pay structure rewards seniority, advanced degrees, and board 
certification by determining teacher salaries solely on these factors. 
 
2.2.2 Criticism. The accountability reform movement has been met with 
considerable pushback from both teachers unions and some researchers. This is 
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attributable largely due to the difficulty in determining an appropriate basis for evaluating 
teacher effectiveness. Teachers unions and some researchers point to the poor quality of 
student test scores as an evaluation measure, the inaccuracy of using standardized tests to 
assess an individual teacher’s performance, and the unfairness of using tests to compare 
teachers (Salmon-Cox, 1981; Popham, 1999; Rosenberg & Silva, 2012; Ravitch, 2016). 
Major disagreement persists over how reliable student test scores are as a measure of 
teacher effectiveness. Critics argue that test-based accountability increases the time spent 
on test preparation rather than genuine instruction, saps teachers' morale, undercuts 
teachers' professionalism, and may even prompt teachers to cheat to raise test scores 
fraudulently (Nichols & Berliner, 2007; Stout, 2013). Furthermore, critics argue that 
high-stakes testing has created negative unintended consequences such as the lowering of 
standards, narrowing curriculum, and teaching to the test. 
Similarly, merit pay proposals are exceedingly controversial. While standard 
practice in the private sector, merit pay is not common in public education. Researchers 
have estimated that only 3.5% of school districts (500 out of 14,000) report having merit 
pay plans at all and in the districts where they exist “most were so weak that they 
represented no meaningful change from traditional compensation systems,” suggesting 
the plans were more symbolic than substantive (Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 
2008; Buck & Greene, 2011). Some merit pay opponents argue that the sizes of the 
incentives are not substantial enough to change behavior. 
Teachers unions have also been consistently opposed to merit pay arguing that 
out-of-school factors which teachers have no control over significantly affect student 
achievement and stricter evaluations place an unfair pressure on teachers. Unions have 
exerted political influence to halt merit pay implementation at both the district and state 
level (Podgurdsky & Springer, 2007; Moe, 2011). Unfortunately, there is little scholarly 
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research available that proves or refutes the idea that paying teachers for their 
performance will improve student achievement. 
 
2.2.3 Reform Efforts. In the early 1990s, accountability measures in education 
emerged at the state level. As governors began to realize that excellent schools were 
necessary to attract new business and retain skilled workers, they began expecting 
schools to deliver great results (Kendall & Marzano, 1997; Kohn, 2000; Ravitch, 2016). 
Accountability reform came to the national stage in 2001 with the passage of No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB). The law created a nearly utopian federal benchmark for student 
achievement—that every student be “proficient” in reading and math by 2014 and sought 
to hold schools accountable by requiring them to make “Adequate Yearly Progress” or 
face serious punitive consequences (Hess & Finn, 2007). Today, NCLB is widely 
considered unsuccessful as it unintentionally incentivized states to narrow curriculum to 
the tested subjects and test taking strategies and to lower standards in order to preserve 
their federal education funding. However, researchers have said that the enormous 
amount of data, in particular disaggregated test scores by racial groups, will provide 
essential information necessary to understand and overcome the achievement gap 
(Glazer, 2011). 
Where they have been implemented, merit pay plans have achieved varied levels 
of political success (Moore Johnson, 1984; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Districts and states 
across the country responded to A Nation at Risk with a flurry of activity by establishing 
merit pay programs, most of which were short-lived. One district which typifies the 
political fluctuation associated with merit pay is Fairfax County Public School District, 
Virginia. The plan was implemented in the district's 165 schools in 1989-90 school year 
granting “bonuses of nine percent of salaries…awarded each year for four years to 
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teachers deemed ‘skillful’ or ‘exemplary’” (Protsik, 1995, p. 14). Despite public support 
for the plan, two major local teachers unions claimed the plan was “too costly, and that it 
undermined collegiality amongst teachers by creating a competitive working 
environment” (Protsik, 1995, p. 14). Due to budget cuts, “the plan was suspended in 
1992...then restored to a scaled-down version in 1994” (Protsik, 1995, p. 14). 
In more recent years, the Obama Administration’s Race to the Top program 
offered $4.3 billion in grants to encourage states to implement performance pay systems 
and require schools to take student achievement into account when considering teachers 
for tenure (Rosenberg & Silva, 2012). Former Education Secretary Arne Duncan made 
performance pay for teachers was his department’s highest priority. As a result of 
competitive federal grants, the merit pay trend grew in popularity in the 2000s with these 
funds incentivizing compensation systems that include the use of test scores. Many states 
submitted applications promising action on this front. 
Alabama’s Race to the Top application originally proposed merit pay and a new 
salary schedule that would give more money to teachers in high demand subjects 
including math, science, and special education, but that portion of the application was 
deleted after Alabama Education Association leader Paul Hubbert wrote the state 
superintendent a letter in opposition (Buck & Greene, 2011, p. 28). As part of an 
education budget increase in 2005-2006, Governor Mitt Romney proposed merit pay in 
Massachusetts, but that proposal was defeated after the Massachusetts Teachers 
Association and United Teachers of Lowell opposed the idea (Buck & Greene, 2011). In 
2010, the Florida state legislature “enacted one of the more stringent proposals any state 
has ever attempted” only to have the bill vetoed by Governor Charlie Crist (Buck & 
Greene, 2011, p.27). 
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2.2.4 Prior Research. Research has demonstrated that teachers’ attitudes about 
accountability vary depending on how accountability is defined. Scholars have found 
evidence that the majority of teachers opposed to policies that tie teachers’ evaluations to 
student achievement on standardized tests (Donegan & Trepanier-Street, 1998). Instead, 
surveys of public school teachers reveal that they are seeking fair, balanced teacher 
evaluations which take in a variety of measures of a teacher overall performance beyond 
just student test scores, such as classroom observations, student surveys, and other 
indicators. 
Research is also divided over whether teachers would support a merit pay system. 
A 2012 Education Sector report states “do teachers support pay reform? It depends. 
Overall, teachers are not convinced that they should be paid based on performance. With 
evaluation measures not well-established or understood, teachers are anxious about the 
use of test scores as a measure” (Rosenberg & Silva, 2012, p. 6). Conversely, the findings 
of Rist (1983), Ballou and Podgursky (1993), and Goldhaber (2006) challenge the 
common supposition that most teachers oppose merit pay, finding that teachers in 
districts that use merit pay do not seem demoralized by the system or hostile toward it, 
and teachers of disadvantaged and low-achieving students generally endorse the merit 
pay concept. 
 Goldhaber (2002) and his colleagues at the Center for Education Data and 
Research, who have studied teacher attitudes about pay reform extensively, suggest that 
teacher support for merit pay is sensitive to program design. Teachers may be more 
supportive of pay reforms that are based on factors over which teachers have more 
personal control, such as what subject and in what school they teach. If this is true, the 
less control teachers feel they have over performance measures, like student test scores, 
the less likely they will be to support proposals that tie pay to performance. 
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Some studies have examined the relationship between teachers unions and 
teaching pay structures. Hanushek (2007) and Grissom and Strunk (2012) find that 
unionized school districts favor salaries that reward veteran teachers above novices, even 
when such salary schemes are uncorrelated with student achievement. Similarly, Hoxby 
and Leigh (2004) and Figlio (2002) argue that, due to a union-related compression of the 
salary scale in which pay is not determined by job performance, highly qualified teachers 
face opportunity costs to entering the profession, limiting the district’s capacity to recruit 
teachers via higher salaries and higher ability. 
 
2.3 Charter Schools & Private School Vouchers 
Milton Friedman’s 1962 publication of Capitalism and Freedom first described 
the potential of competitive market forces to strengthen educational quality and 
efficiency. He argued that a voucher system which would allow needy families to choose 
which private school they wanted their children to attend would improve education 
(Friedman, 1955). Just four years later, the “Coleman Report” provided the catalyst for 
standards-based reform, which includes the crucial charter school concept of holding a 
school accountable for its results. University of Massachusetts professor Ray Budde is 
credited for the initial charter school concept as his 1988 treatise called “Education by 
Charter: Restructuring School Districts” caught the attention of the late union boss Al 
Shanker, who cited it in an influential speech at the National Press Club the same year 
(Finn & Wright, 2016; Kahlenberg & Potter, 2014). Shanker saw chartering as “a way to 
foster teacher professionalism by allowing them to start new schools” and experiment in 
their approach to teaching and learning (Finn & Wright, 2016; Shanker, 1988). These 
ideas eventually reached Minnesota, where a group of educators and policy innovators 
would introduce and help pass that state’s pioneering charter law in 1991 (Junge, 2012). 
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These school choice advocates believed that in charter schools, teachers would be given 
the opportunity to create high-performing educational laboratories from which traditional 
public schools could learn.  
The 1990s witnessed growing attention to the adoption of the choice-based school 
reforms Friedman, Coleman, and Shanker originally championed, yet despite the 
proliferation of charter school networks and school voucher programs the school choice 
concept has not been embraced by all. Modern studies have shown that public school 
teachers are about as likely to favor charter schools as they are to oppose them (Duffett et 
al., 2008). Private school vouchers are less popular among teachers; according to the 
2003 Survey of Educators about 25% of teachers support them (See Table Panel E of 
Table 3). 
 
2.3.1 Definitions. As a general concept, school choice refers to parents’ freedom 
in choosing where their child is educated whether that be at a traditional public school, a 
charter school, or a private or religious school instead of being assigned one based on 
where the child lives. Proponents argue that school choice creates competition amongst 
schools that will improve quality in the marketplace for education (Chubb & Moe, 1991). 
There are two main strains of the school choice reform movement: charter schools and 
school vouchers.4 
A charter school is an independently-run publicly funded school established by 
teachers, parents, or community groups under the terms of a charter granted by a local or 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that although these are the categories of school choice that receive the most 
attention today, they are not the only types of school choice. Most choice plans involve traditional public 
schools within the district, magnet schools, specialty schools, and alternative schools run by the school 
system. Some cities employ plans in which parents rank their desired school by order of preference and 
districts offer choice (Ryan & Heise, 2002; Sugarman & Kemerer, 2011). 
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national authority such as a school board. This “charter” is a performance contract 
detailing the school’s mission, programs, students served, performance goals, and 
methods of assessment. Charter schools operate with freedom from many of the 
regulations imposed on traditional public schools, but are held accountable for academic 
results and upholding other promises of their charter such as financial management and 
organizational stability. If a charter school fails to meet these performance goals, it may 
be shut down. Charter schools accept students by random, public lottery and receive 
funding on a per pupil basis. Charter schools vary greatly in their design and results, but 
are best understood as a geographically targeted education reform. Charter school 
networks have proliferated in predominantly low-income, urban, and minority settings. 
The other arm of the school choice movement, school vouchers, are government-
funded subsidies that are redeemable for partial or full tuition fees at a private school. 
Under such a program, funds typically spent by a school district are reallocated to a 
participating family in the form of a voucher to pay for a child’s private school, including 
both religious and non-religious options. Similarly to charter schools, private school 
vouchers are a highly targeted reform aimed at serving disadvantaged children from low-
income families, children currently attending a poorly performing traditional public 
school, or children with disabilities. 
In theory, a voucher program would increase competition between private and 
public schools, who are both competing for the voucher funds, which would keep costs 
low and quality of schooling high. There is some evidence that school vouchers result in 
cost savings for school systems (in Indiana, for example) and some studies have found 
evidence that voucher programs can slightly improve student test scores and graduation 
rates, both at voucher-accepting private schools and nearby public schools (Leuken, 
2016; Rouse & Barrow, 2009; Hoxby, 1996; Ladd, 2002; Sandström & Bergstöm, 2005). 
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However, private school voucher systems are relatively rare and there is general lack of 
results that can conclusively show their positive or negative effects. 
 
2.3.2 Criticism. The movement against school choice reforms has been fervent. 
Critics of charter schools and private school vouchers argue that these policies divert 
taxpayer money away from traditional public schools to unaccountable private or charter 
schools, therefore leaving the remaining students with even less resources. Though the 
former president of the American Federation of Teachers, Al Shanker, was an early 
champion of charter schools, union leaders and charter school advocates are frequently at 
odds today. When it comes to lobbying to block school choice in the states, the national 
teachers unions: the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education 
Association (NEA), are the two biggest spenders (Coulson, 2010). 
Unions attack charter schools on the basis that they hire less qualified teachers as 
measured by certifications and experience. A 2004 Department of Education study found 
that charter schools are less likely than traditional public schools to employ teachers 
meeting state certification standards (Finnigan, Adelman, Anderson, Cotton, Donnelly, & 
Price, 2004). Still others have pointed to charter schools’ teachers’ exemption from 
collective bargaining laws and union protection. Education historian Diane Ravitch has 
estimated that 95% of charters are not unionized and believes charters follow an 
unsustainable practice of requiring teachers to work unusually long hours in poor 
facilities, making them especially vulnerable to burnout (Ravitch, 2013). Teacher attrition 
rates are high in charter schools and dissatisfaction with salaries and working conditions 
are common among teachers who leave charter schools. 
Some opponents say that charter schools siphon resources away from traditional 
public schools and accuse for-profit entities and private foundations of funding charter 
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school initiatives to undermine public education and turn education into a business which 
can turn a profit. Critics also claim that many charter schools are poorly run. As 
independently run organizations, charter schools do not have the obligation to teach the 
toughest students and they can turn difficult students away significantly more easily than 
a traditional public school can. Although charter schools choose their students through a 
lottery, critics claim that these lotteries are often rigged because charter schools may 
engage in selective admission of students likely to succeed based on their tests scores. 
Criticisms of private school vouchers follow a similar line of reasoning. Besides 
the lack of empirical evidence supporting their efficacy, there is some evidence that 
school vouchers can lead to racial or income segregation (Gooden, Jabbar, & Torres, 
2016), though this research is inconclusive as other studies found that in certain 
circumstances segregation can be reduced by increasing school choice (Nechyba, 2003). 
A 2018 study found that disadvantaged students in Louisiana who won a lottery to 
receive vouchers to attend private schools had lower math, reading, science, and social 
studies scores; these effects may be due partly to selection of low-quality private schools 
into the program (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018). Others claim that voucher 
programs raise constitutional issues of separation between church and state as most 
voucher money goes to private religious institutions (Simon, 2014). The strongest 
criticism of school choice is that it distracts from the real issue of reform—public schools 
that are failing should be fixed, not abandoned. Politicians should focus on fully funding 
and improving the public system, not siphon resources into the questionable quality of 
private or charter schools. 
 
2.3.3 Reform Efforts. Due to the nature of securing a local charter, the charter 
school movement has been a largely geographically focused education reform serving 
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primarily high-minority population in urban cities. The Knowledge is Power Program 
(KIPP) is the most geographically expansive charter school network operating 209 
schools across the country and serving 90,000 students (Knowledge is Power Program, 
2018). Other successful networks such as Breakthrough Schools (Cleveland, OH), YES 
Prep (Houston, TX) and Uncommon Schools (NY, NJ, and MA) are regionally based. 
After Hurricane Katrina, charter schools account for 60% of all public schools in New 
Orleans (Childress & Weber, 2010). By design, charter schools are unique, each with an 
innovative and distinct educational philosophy. Thus, it is difficult to access the success 
of the charter school movement as a whole. Though a number of studies have shown that 
charter schools outperform traditional public schools as measured by test scores, 
especially in math, other scholars have critiqued these studies accusing charter schools of 
“creaming” or pulling the students most likely to succeed out of traditional public schools 
(Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Cohodes, Dynarski, Fullerton, Kane, & Pathak, 2009; 
Childress & Weber, 2010; Bulkley & Fisler, 2003). There is, however, strong evidence 
that parents and students who remain in charter schools are satisfied (Bulkley & Fisler, 
2003). 
Likewise, private school voucher programs are as diverse as the private schools 
that participate. Vouchers (specifically Ohio’s Cleveland Scholarship Program) were 
declared constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002 (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris). 
As of March 2017, fourteen states and the District of Colombia have enacted school 
voucher programs serving more than just low-income families (Education Commission of 
the States [ECS], 2018).5 Eligibility requirements vary by state, but the majority of these 
                                                 
5 They are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin (ECS, 2018). 
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programs were offered to students in low-income families, low-performing schools, or 
students with disabilities. 
Vouchers gained national prominence in 1990, with the creation of the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program (EdChoice, 2018). Today, Indiana’s Choice Scholarship 
Program is the largest voucher program in terms of statewide income-based eligibility (50 
percent of families with children) and also in terms of participation (34,299 enrollees in 
2016–17) (EdChoice, 2018). By 2014, the number of students participating in voucher or 
tax-credit scholarships had increased to 250,000, a tiny fraction compared to the 55 
million in traditional public schools (Simon, 2014). 
 
2.3.4 Prior Research. An extensive body of research around charter schools and 
private school vouchers exists, including a great deal of scholarly work published in peer-
reviewed journals. Although researchers have approached the school choice debate 
empirical directions previously, the overwhelming majority focus on these programs’ 
effect on student achievement. Not much attention has been paid to examining teachers’ 
attitudes toward school choice. The first systematic analysis of teacher attitudes toward 
school choice was conducted via a mail survey and found that more experienced teachers, 
those who identify as Democrats, and those who majored in education as undergraduates 
are more likely to oppose charter schools (Hess, Maranto, & Millima, 2000).  
More experienced teachers, Democrats, and union members are also more likely 
to oppose private school vouchers (Hess, Maranto, & Millima, 2000). Further evidence 
from a survey of Arizona and Nevada teachers, found that “white, experienced, 
unionized, Democratic educators...are less supportive of school choice” (Ferraiolo, Hess, 
Maranto, & Milliman, 2004, p. 209).  
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3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data Description 
The source of the vast majority of data used in this analysis is the Brookings 
Institution’s Survey for Educators, which is a nationally representative sample of 3,264 
full-time, K-12 public school teachers conducted in April 2003. The Survey of Educators 
provides a large quantity of demographic information about teachers in conjunction with 
their opinions on specific education reform initiatives. In addition to standard 
demographic information such as gender, race, age, marital status, and household income, 
there are a number of variables reporting political beliefs and opinions about education 
policy issues including but not limited to teacher tenure, accountability for student 
outcomes, merit pay, charter schools, and private school vouchers. Since not all 
respondents chose to answer every question on the survey, the number of observations 
varies throughout in order to preserve as many responses as possible for each model.6 
Supplementary data from the 2003 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS) was also merged to the Survey of Educators data. IPEDS, which is 
developed by the Institute of Education Sciences—the statistics, research, and evaluation 
arm of the U.S. Department of Education—contains information about every college and 
university that participates in federal student financial aid programs; however, there are 
some missing values as IPEDS relies on self-reporting by institutions. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent Variables. This study uses the explanatory variables drawn 
from these two sources to explain teachers’ opinions on education reform initiatives 
                                                 
6 The question with the worst response rate (95%) was “At what college or university did you get your 
undergraduate degree?” 
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concerning tenure, accountability, merit pay, charter schools, and private school 
vouchers. 
The Survey of Educators asks each teacher “Would you support or oppose a 
policy proposal that would eliminate teacher tenure, but in return provide teachers a 20% 
increase in salary?,” “Would you support such a proposal if salaries were increased by 
30%?,” “Would you support such a proposal if salaries were increased by 40%?,” and 
finally, “Would you support such a policy if salaries were increased by 50%?.” Using 
each teacher’s response to these four questions, an ordered categorical variable was 
created which indicates at what level– 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, or never – a teacher 
expressed support for a proposal which would eliminate tenure in exchange for a 
particular increase in salary. About 49% of respondents were supportive of a policy that 
would eliminate tenure in exchange for a 20% salary increase. An additional 7% were 
supportive when the salary increase was raised to 30%. Another 6% of respondents 
became supportive when the salary increase was increased to 40%. The final salary 
increase of 50% persuaded an additional 9% of respondents to support tenure elimination, 
leaving about 28% of teachers unwilling to eliminate tenure in exchange for a salary 
increase of any level. These responses were coded as 5 (willing to give up at 20%), 4 
(willing to give up at 30%), 3 (willing to give up at 40%), 2 (willing to give up at 50%), 
and 1 (never willing to give up). The complete frequency distribution of this variable is 
given in Panel A of Table 1.  
 Respondents were also asked “Do you think individual teachers should be held 
accountable for how much their own students learn during the school year?” Of the 2,939 
teachers who responded to this question, 42% answered “yes” teachers should be held 
accountable for student learning while 58% answered “no.” Those who support 
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accountability were coded as 1 and those who oppose accountability were coded as 0 
(See Panel B of Table 1). 
Respondents were also asked which of the following types of pay systems they 
would prefer: “A system in which pay is determined by seniority and experience” or “A 
system in which pay is partly determined by seniority and experience and partly by 
evaluations of merit.” Of the 3,264 teachers who responded to this question, 53% support 
merit pay while 47% supported a system which salary is not based on merit. Those who 
support the policy were coded as 1 and those who oppose the merit-based policy were 
coded as 0 (See Panel C of Table 1). 
Respondents were also asked “What is your position on charter schools?” and had 
the option of answering support, oppose, or don’t know. For the purposes of this survey, 
the small number of teachers who answered ‘don’t know’ were dropped from the 
analysis. Among the 2,824 public school teachers who did answer this question, 41% 
support charter schools and 59% did not (See Panel D of Table 1). 
Respondents were also asked “What is your position on private school vouchers 
for disadvantaged kids?” and had the option of answering support, oppose, or don’t 
know. Once again, the few teachers who answered ‘don’t know’ were dropped from the 
analysis. Among the 2,995 teachers who did answer this question, 25% support private 
school vouchers and 75% did not (See Panel E of Table 1). 
 
3.1.2 Independent Variables. The key explanatory variable of interest, which is 
unique to this study, is the respondent’s undergraduate institution. Using national 
rankings, each teacher’s undergraduate institution was classified as a second-tier 
university, top tier university, a second-tier liberal arts college, top tier liberal arts 
college, or an ivy league or ivy-like institution. These rankings are used to create a new 
27 
 
 
categorical variable called college type. Table 2 reports the distribution of college types 
amongst teachers who reported their undergraduate institution in the Survey of 
Educators.7 To clarify how undergraduate institutions were classified into one of the five 
categories, second-tier universities include all community colleges, regional public 
schools (public schools that are not the flagship university of that state) and second-tier, 
non-selective private schools.8 Top-tier universities include both flagship public schools 
and top-tier, selective private schools. Top-tier liberal arts colleges include any liberal 
arts college ranked in the top 200 by 2017 U.S. News rankings. Second-tier liberal arts 
colleges include any liberal arts college that was ranked below the top 200 liberal arts 
colleges. Lastly, the ivy-like category includes any of the eight members of the Ivy 
League combined with universities which have comparable connotations of academic 
excellence and selectivity in admissions. 
There are 842 distinct universities represented amongst the 3,107 teachers who 
could be matched to a particular college or university. One will notice that two-thirds 
(67.3%) of teachers surveyed attended a school that has been classified as a second-tier 
university. Around 15% of teachers attended a top-tier university, another 12% attended a 
liberal arts college with one-third of those being top-tier liberal arts colleges, and the 
remaining 6% of teachers attended and ivy-league or ivy-like institution. This breakdown 
loosely reconfirms prior empirical studies which have demonstrated that the majority of 
                                                 
7 Respondents were permitted to list their undergraduate institution however they wanted, so not all 
responses were salvageable. Additionally, not all respondents chose to answer this question (95% response 
rate). Those that listed a college or university that could be matched to a particular IPEDS code were used 
for regression analysis. 
8 A flagship university refers to a state’s public, land-grant institution. While the definition varies slightly 
from state to state, it is likely to be one of if not the largest and best endowed universities in the state, and 
the university with the highest research profile and the most doctoral programs. It may house the state’s 
medical school, law school, or both. Membership in the prestigious Association of American Universities 
may be yet another factor, and NCAA Division I athletics is a must. 
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the teaching workforce is drawn from those who attended lesser quality colleges and 
universities (Ballou, Dale, & Podgursky, 1998). 
In addition to placing undergraduate institutions in five categories, supplementary 
data was merged from the 2003 IPEDS on each institution’s 25th and 75th percentiles 
composite SAT scores, public-private status, percent of students from in-state, and 
percent of students who pay full tuition.9 Summary statistics of these variables are 
reported in Panel C of Table 3. For those schools which report ACT scores instead of 
SAT scores, the conversion table provided by the ACT organization is used to transform 
the ACT scores into SAT scores. In all, 2,869 institutions report either an SAT or an ACT 
distribution for the incoming class.  
The reasons for including the public-private status, percent of students in-state, 
and percent of students who pay full tuition as control variables is to mitigate the 
limitations of this dataset and models’ ability to consider the financial background of 
teachers prior to entering college which may or may not be relevant in shaping their 
attitudes about education reform proposals. For instance, one might claim that a teacher 
who went to college surrounded by classmates of a high socioeconomic status (at a 
private university with a high percentage of full-pay students and a lower percentage of 
in-state students) would think differently about education reform proposals that a teacher 
who attended a college with lower-income classmates, and therefore their family’s 
financial background would be the true predictor of their attitudes, not the quality of their 
undergraduate training. If these control variables are found to be statistically 
                                                 
9 Percent full-pay is defined as the percentage of students who receive no financial assistance, either from 
their university or in the form of government grants or loans. Due to the limitations of the Survey of 
Educators, no information on the teachers’ familial and financial background around the time they were 
entering college is known. 
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insignificant, this story of teachers’ attitude formation will be less credible than my 
argument that the training itself has an important impact on attitudes. 
Beyond these main variables of interest pertaining to the quality of teachers’ 
undergraduate institutions, several personal characteristics are used to predict a teacher’s 
likelihood of support for various education reform initiatives. Individual teachers were 
asked to indicate their gender (male or female), race (black, white, Hispanic, or other), 
marital status (married or unmarried), annual household income (under $50,000, between 
$50,00 and $99,999, $100,000 or more), political party (Democrat, Republican, 
Independent, or other party), and risk aversion (risk avoiders or risk takers). When asked 
“which term best describes you…” respondents were given the options of “risk taker” or 
“risk avoider.” Those who selected “risk avoider” were coded as a 1 and those who 
selected “risk taker” were coded as a 0. Summary statistics of these variables are reported 
in Panel A of Table 3. 
Additional independent variables pertaining to the respondents’ status as a 
teachers are also included as potential predictors of their opinions about education policy. 
These job and school characteristics variables include years of experience teaching 
(ranging from 0 to 45 years), union membership (members coded as 1), school location 
(inner city, urban, suburban, small town, or rural), and grade level assignment 
(elementary, middle school, high school, or mixed grade levels). Summary statistics of 
these variables are reported in Panel B of Table 3. Most notably, the mean number of 
years of experience amongst the surveyed teachers is 17 years, more than three-quarters 
of the teachers are union members (82%), and the teachers are fairly uniformly 
distributed across grade level.  
To examine the predictive effects of categorical variables such as race, income, 
political party, school location, and grade level assignment, a full set of dummy variables 
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was created for each categorical variable. One of the dummy variables from each 
category will be omitted in regressions for comparison. 
 
3.2 Regression Models & Hypotheses 
Three econometric models per dependent variable were estimated to answer the 
empirical questions of this paper (for a total of 15 regressions). Model 1 simply accounts 
for the personal characteristics and job and school characteristics variables— the most 
obvious suspects to have an effect on teachers’ attitudes about education reform 
proposals. Model 2 adds in the college type dummies excluding second-tier universities 
for comparison. Model 3 replaces the self-designed quality classification system of 
college type variables with the objective measures of undergraduate institution quality 
measured by the college characteristics variables. Specifically, Model 3 includes the 
average aptitude-based selectivity requirements (SAT scores) of teacher’s undergraduate 
institution as a proxy to measure the quality of an individual teacher’s bachelor’s degree 
and as a proxy for a teacher’s academic aptitude prior to becoming a teacher. Therefore, 
all models account for a number of personal characteristics and job and school 
characteristics variables described previously. 
Mathematically, the three models, which will be applied to each of the five 
dependent variables, are: 
where subscript i indicates teacher i, Yi is teacher’s attitude toward tenure elimination, 
accountability for student outcomes, merit pay, charter schools, or private school 
Model 1: Yi = β0 + βPCXPC, i + βSCXSC, i + εi 
Model 2: Yi = β0 + βPCXPC, i + βSCXSC, i + βCTXCT, i + εi 
Model 3:  Yi = β0 + βPCXPC, i + βSCXSC, i + βCCXCC, i + εi 
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vouchers, XPC is a matrix of personal characteristics, XSC is a matrix of job and school 
characteristics, and XCT is a matrix of college type, XCC is a vector of college 
characteristics, all of the β’s are the coefficients to be estimated, and εi is an error term 
with the standard proportion. 
 
3.2.1 Methodology. The tenure elimination dependent variable is mathematically 
different from the other dependent variables in this study, because tenure elimination is 
ordered (from 5 to 1) while the others are binary. For the categorical variable which 
measures a teachers’ willingness to give up tenure in exchange for an increased salary, an 
ordered logit model is estimated to determine what factors predict a teacher’s decision to 
support or oppose such a reform proposal. This approach produces regression results 
which are not as readily interpretable as ordinary least squares or other non-linear models 
for which estimated effects can be calculated at median values. An ordered logit, 
however, does provide a more sophisticated and correct estimation as each teacher’s 
response is categorical and of an ordered nature. The regression results from an ordered 
logit are interpreted by noting the sign of the coefficients and statistical significance. 
Thus, as the tenure elimination variable correlates with one’s willingness to give up 
tenure, explanatory variables with negative estimated coefficients are associated with 
wanting to protect tenure while explanatory variables with positive estimated coefficients 
are associated with being more willing to give up tenure. As the dependent variable 
increases, a teacher becomes more willing to support the tenure elimination proposal (or 
thought of in another way teachers want to protect tenure less vigorously). 
Beyond sign and significance, ordered logit regressions have ancillary parameters 
which designate the cut points between each category and thus show how easily an 
individual can cross the threshold from one category into the next category. These 
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parameters divide a number line ranging from negative infinity to positive infinity into 
the number of categories of the dependent variable (in the case of tenure elimination 5 
categories). The location of these ancillary parameters is not particularly important, but 
their relation to one another is significant because this distance represents the magnitude 
of the change in the predicted values required for the predicted value to shift into the next 
category. For instance, if the predicted value is below the first ancillary parameter, that 
observation is predicted to be in the first category (willing to give up tenure for a 20% 
salary increase). If the predicted value is between the first and second ancillary 
parameters, that observation is predicted to be in the second category (willing to give up 
tenure for a 30% salary increase) and so on. 
Unlike teacher tenure support which required an ordered logit, accountability, 
merit pay support, charter school, and private school vouchers support will be estimated 
with a standard logit model. Moreover, in order to facilitate ease of interpretation, the 
marginal effects at median values of the logit models will be reported. These marginal 
effects at median values can be interpreted as the percentage likelihood, on average, that 
a member of a certain class is to support the reform proposal in comparison to the omitted 
class, holding the other characteristics in the model constant. 
 
3.2.2 Expectations. Taking into account previous scholars’ research as an 
interpretative framework, it is expected that more experienced, Democratic, and 
unionized teachers will be less likely to support the tenure elimination in exchange for a 
salary increase proposal, less likely to support accountability for student outcomes, less 
likely to support merit pay, less likely to support charter schools, and less likely to 
support private school vouchers than their less experienced, Republican, and non-
unionized counterparts holding the other variables in the models concept (Hess, Maranto, 
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& Milliman, 2000; Ferraiolo, Hess, Maranto, & Milliman, 2004; Moe, 2011). Therefore, 
the expectation is that the coefficients on these variables (Years of experience, Democrat, 
Union Member) will be negative in all regression models (suggesting these teachers are 
more likely to oppose these reforms). 
The impetus for my study grew from the belief that the quality of teacher training 
is related to teachers’ attitudes about education reform initiatives. The regression analysis 
allows us to test the idea that teachers who received training at a high quality 
undergraduate institution are more likely to support education reform proposals than 
teachers who were trained at lesser quality undergraduate institutions. In particular, the 
hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Teachers trained at higher quality undergraduate institutions are more 
likely to support a tenure elimination in exchange for a salary increase proposal 
than teachers trained at a second-tier university. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Teachers trained at higher quality undergraduate institutions are more 
likely to support accountability and merit pay for teachers than teachers trained at 
a second-tier university. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Teachers trained a higher quality undergraduate institution are more likely 
to support the expansion of charter schools and private school vouchers for 
disadvantaged kids than teachers trained at a second-tier university. 
 
The reasoning behind Hypothesis 1 is that teachers who attended a top-tier 
university or an ivy-like university received high quality training, and are, in theory, more 
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confident in their abilities and instruction. Consequently, such teachers would be more 
likely to support a proposal that would eliminate tenure in exchange for greater pay since 
they believe they are excellent teachers who would be highly evaluated and retain their 
job in a system without tenure. Furthermore, individuals who attended high quality 
undergraduate institutions are likely to have more career options open to them (both 
educational and non-educational). Their high academic aptitude as well as their college’s 
abilities to expose students to a variety of occupational alternatives make them better 
candidates for non-teaching positions, many of which pay substantially higher salaries 
than a teaching career. Prospective employers are also likely to recruit graduates of 
selective colleges more aggressively than graduates of less selective ones. For these top-
tier college graduates the cost of giving up tenure is low and the benefit of a higher salary 
outweighs the risk of losing one’s job, therefore supporting the tenure elimination 
proposal is worthwhile. 
Conversely, teachers who attended lesser quality undergraduate institutions may 
be less confident in their instructional abilities or their ability to secure a non-teaching job 
and would be more likely to oppose tenure elimination. Believing that they may receive 
poor evaluations and could be fired if they were to forgo tenure protection, tenure is more 
valuable and costlier to give up to these second-tier university graduates. They have far 
fewer career options open to them than the graduates of top-tier universities. Even in 
exchange for substantial salary increases, these teachers are less willing to support a 
tenure elimination policy. To reiterate, if the risk of losing one’s job in a system without 
tenure is high, tenure job protection is more valuable than a salary increase and then the 
teacher would oppose the proposal and remain protected with a lower salary. 
Beyond these economic reasons, there are cultural influences that might also 
support this hypothesis. Individuals who grew up in an affluent family (who are also 
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more likely to have attended a top-tier university) are likely to have been influenced by 
their parents and peers to favor conservative, anti-union values. Thus, those who chose to 
enter the relatively low salary and heavily unionized profession of teaching believe they 
can make a meaningful impact on their students’ learning, but do not necessarily buy into 
teachers unions’ belief that tenure is extremely valuable, so they are more willing to give 
up tenure protection. On the other hand, individuals who grew up in a family of low 
socioeconomic status tend to favor liberal, pro-union values (and are generally more 
likely to attend a second-tier university). To graduates of these second-tier universities 
who become teachers, union job protection in the form of tenure may be viewed as very 
valuable and therefore costlier to give up.  
A similar rationale can be used to understand Hypothesis 2. Teachers who 
attended high quality universities are more confident in their teaching abilities and 
believe they would receive high evaluations for their students’ achievement and be 
rewarded in a merit pay system for their superior performance. They are more 
comfortable being held accountable for their students’ learning because they perceive 
themselves to be an excellent teacher. Moreover, these teachers are familiar with working 
hard in a challenging, competitive environment like their undergraduate career. To these 
teachers, the prospect of a challenging, competitive environment in their teaching career 
is motivating, not intimidating. For teachers who attended a second-tier university, such 
an environment may be more intimidating than motivating and they would prefer a pay 
schedule that rewards seniority and experience rather than merit which they are skeptical 
they could benefit from. 
Hypothesis 3 has a more indirect explanation than Hypothesis 1 or 2, but the same 
logic applies. Teachers who attended a higher quality undergraduate institution are likely 
to be confident in their abilities and familiar with a competitive environment, leading 
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them to support choice-based reforms including the expansion of charter schools or 
private school vouchers which increase competition among schools and increase 
accountability for teaching effectiveness compared to a teacher who attended a second-
tier university and is less confident in their ability and less drawn to competitive working 
environments. 
 
3.3 Empirical Results & Discussion 
This section presents and interprets the regression results. The main contribution 
to the literature concerns the relationship between the quality of undergraduate institution 
and teacher attitudes. For that reason, focus is placed on the estimated coefficients on the 
college type variables included in Model 2 throughout this discussion. Due to the small 
sample size of the top-tier liberal arts college, second-tier liberal arts college, and ivy-
league university categories, the estimated coefficients on these variables are rarely 
significant and therefore not mentioned in discussion, but note that the sign of these 
coefficients generally match that of the top-tier university category. Throughout the 
remainder of this thesis, the two largest categories, top-tier universities and second-tier 
universities are compared and contrasted extensively. Following that discussion will be a 
brief review of the results concerning personal characteristics and job and school 
characteristics.  
 
3.3.1 College Type & College Characteristics. Concerning the unique element 
of this paper, quality of teacher training, Table 4 sheds light on the relationship between 
teacher training at the undergraduate level and a teacher’s willingness to support a 
proposal that would eliminate tenure in exchange for a salary increase using an ordered 
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logit regression. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficients in the college type 
regression supports Hypothesis 1 that teachers who attended a ‘top-tier university’ or an 
‘ivy or ivy like’ university are more likely to take the tenure tradeoff than teachers who 
attend a ‘second-tier university’ (p-value<0.01 for top-tier universities; p-value<0.05 for 
ivy-like universities). In fact, all college type variables included in the tenure elimination 
regression has a positive estimated coefficient, indicating that teachers who went to 
second-tier universities (the category which was omitted) are the most likely to want to 
protect tenure or all college type groups. As discussed in the expectations section, there 
are a few arguments for why this may be the case, but the most evident is that teachers 
who were trained at better quality institutions are more confident in their teaching ability 
and thus believe they would retain their job in a system without tenure whereas teachers 
who attended a second-tier university prefer to keep their tenure protection.  
Furthermore, when the college type classification dummy variables are removed 
from the regression and instead college characteristics measuring selectivity are included 
(Model 3), the results indicate that as the 25th percentile SAT scores of the teacher’s 
undergraduate institution increase, so does the likelihood that the teacher would support a 
tenure elimination for a salary increase proposal (p-value<0.01).10 This result 
demonstrates that the teachers drawn from the highest academically achieving institutions 
are significantly more likely to support tenure reform than those drawn from less 
academically prestigious schools. As predicted, none of the control variables (Public 
University, Percent of Students In-state, Percent of Students Full-pay) in Model 3 were 
significant predictors. 
                                                 
10 The results are qualitatively unchanged when the 75th SAT score percentile is included in the regression 
rather than the 25th percentile. 
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Teacher attitudes toward accountability and merit pay yields similar results using 
a simple logit approach, lending evidence to Hypothesis 2. The estimated marginal 
effects at median values are reported in Table 5 for accountability and Table 6 for merit 
pay in order to quantify the magnitude of the effects. Specifically, the regression results 
from logit models indicate that, compared to teachers who attended a second-tier 
university, teachers who were trained at top-tier universities are about 7.9% more likely 
to support holding teachers accountable for how much their students learn each year (p-
value<0.01) and 6.5% more likely to support a limited merit pay system over a pay 
system does not reward merit (p-value<0.05). 
The next set of regression results, reported in Table 7 for charter schools and 
Table 8 for private school vouchers, test Hypothesis 3. The results indicate that teachers 
who were trained at higher-quality undergraduate institutions are about 4.2% more likely 
to support charter schools than their counterparts who were trained at lower-quality 
universities, but this result is not statistically significant. Similarly, the college type 
variables are not significant predictors for a teacher’s likelihood to support private school 
vouchers either. Remembering that the hypothesis for the school choice regressions is 
more indirect than Hypothesis 1 or 2, the lack of compelling evidence of success (or 
failure) of charter schools and voucher programs where they have been implemented, and 
because these choice-based reforms are rare and highly geographically focused, it is not 
entirely surprising that the quality of teacher training does not have as noticeable of an 
effect on teacher’s attitudes about this particular reform strategy in comparison to tenure, 
accountability, or merit pay reforms which are more easily understood and relate directly 
to teacher quality and compensation. 
Table 9 provides a direct comparison between top-tier university trained teacher 
attitudes and second-tier university trained teacher attitudes. These statistics are included 
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to further emphasize the divergence in reform attitudes between these groups. Second-tier 
university trained teachers are substantially more likely to oppose all reform policies 
studied except for private school vouchers. Specifically, the Survey of Educators 
indicates that 30% of teachers trained at a second-tier university were not willing to give 
up tenure even for a 50% salary increase as opposed to just 22.5% of teachers trained at 
top-tier universities. About 60% of teachers trained at second-tier universities are 
opposed to accountability for student outcomes compared to 52% opposed among top-tier 
university teachers; 49% of teachers trained at second-tier universities are opposed to 
merit pay compared to 41% opposed among of top-tier trained teachers; about 60% of 
teachers trained at second-tier universities are opposed to charter schools compared to 
54.5% opposed from top-tier universities. Lastly, 75% of teachers trained at second-tier 
universities are opposed to private school vouchers in comparison to 77% opposed 
among teachers trained at top-tier universities, but this result is statistically insignificant 
(See College Types in Table 8). 
 
3.3.2 Personal, Job, & School Characteristics. Overall and in general the 
estimated coefficients on the personal characteristics and job and school characteristics 
do not vary much between models and have the expected sign and significance. More 
experienced, Democratic, and unionized teachers are all less likely to support tenure 
elimination, accountability, merit pay, charter schools, and private school vouchers than 
their less experienced, Republican, or non-union member counterparts. This reaffirms 
prior researchers’ findings. A teacher’s gender, race, household income, marital status, 
school location, and grade level assignment are generally not determinant of their 
attitudes towards these reforms though there are some cases in which these factors are in 
fact statistically significant predictors. 
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Teacher support for certain reforms is also dependent on the phase of their career. 
Revamping the teaching profession by altering tenure is less attractive to more 
experienced teachers who benefit from the status quo. The marginal effect cannot be 
quantified for the tenure elimination regression due to the nature of the ordered logit, but 
we know more experienced teachers are less likely to support this proposal. Each of these 
findings is highly statistically significant (p-value<0.01). Currently, the overwhelming 
majority of school districts follow a single salary pay schedule which rewards experience 
with higher wages. For each additional 10 years in the classroom, teachers are about 8% 
less likely to support merit pay, about 9% less likely to support charter schools, and about 
4% less likely to support private school vouchers. This result may seem counter-intuitive 
since one might expect more experienced teachers, similar to teachers hailing from top-
tier universities, to be more confident in their instruction and thus more likely to support 
reform (and specifically, tenure reform). Yet, more experienced teachers who have been 
in the school system for longer are also more likely to grow distrustful of administration 
and their ability to fairly evaluate teacher effectiveness or enact meaningful changes to 
the profession. Considered in this light, it is sensible that more experienced teachers can 
be both more confident in their own abilities and simultaneously more likely to reject the 
reform proposals discussed. 
As anticipated, union members were much less likely to support any of the reform 
proposals than nonmembers (less likely to support tenure elimination, about 11% less 
likely to support accountability for student outcomes, 13% less likely to support merit 
pay, 22% less likely to support charter schools, and 13% less likely to support private 
school vouchers all at a p-value<0.01). Considering union leaders’ rhetoric and political 
behavior is loudly and consistently opposed to these education reforms, it is unsurprising 
that union members reflect these views in comparison to nonmembers. 
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As expected, teachers who identify as Democrats were also significantly less 
likely to support tenure elimination (p-value<0.01), about 4.5% less likely to support 
accountability for student outcomes (p-value<0.05), about 17% less likely to support 
charter schools (p-value<0.01), and about 22% less likely to support private school 
vouchers (p-value<0.01) than Republican teachers, and slightly less likely (2.5%) to 
support merit pay, but this result is not significant. 
Notably, grade level assignment is also a determining factor in teacher support for 
merit pay and private school vouchers, though it is not relevant in the regressions for 
tenure elimination, accountability, or charter schools. High school teachers are about 8% 
more likely to support merit pay than elementary school teachers (p-value<0.01) and 
middle school teachers are about 5% more likely to support merit pay than elementary 
teachers (p-value<0.05). These results suggest that teachers who work with older students 
are more comfortable with their salary being determined partially on their students’ 
performance. It is also important to distinguish between elementary school teachers as 
generalists, who teach many subjects, whereas middle and high school teachers are likely 
to be specialists who teach only one subject. This supports Goldhaber’s (2002) findings 
that teachers are supportive of merit pay when they feel they have personal control over 
the factors used to determine their effectiveness. Both high school and middle school 
teachers are also 4.6% more likely to support private school vouchers than elementary 
school teachers (p-value<0.05). If teachers were considering their own students when 
answering the private school voucher question, this result may indicate that teachers 
believe that private school vouchers could be effective in higher grade levels, but that a 
voucher program is not a good idea for elementary school students. 
Income class is not a statistically relevant factor for almost all of the policies. 
Teachers with an annual household income of less than $50,000 are more willing to 
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support tenure elimination in exchange for a salary increase and more likely to support 
merit pay, but these results are not significant. Teachers with an annual household 
income of over $100,000 are 6.3% more likely to support accountability than teachers 
with an annual household income between $50,000 and $100,000 (p-value<0.05). It is 
possible that income may be shown to be a statistically relevant factor in teachers’ 
support for more of these education reform policies in future studies if income is 
measured differently (as a continuous variable perhaps or as a teacher’s personal income 
rather than their household income), but these insignificant findings for income in 
shaping teachers’ political attitudes are consistent with more recent research in political 
socialization which has shown that though broad affiliations between low-income 
workers and the Democratic Party and businessmen and the Republican Party still have 
come credibility, those relationships are much weaker than originally believed (Sapiro, 
2004). 
Self-reported risk aversion is statistically significant in predicting teacher support 
for accountability (p-value<0.01), merit pay (p-value<0.01), charter schools (p-
value<0.05), and private school vouchers (p-value<0.05), but not tenure elimination.  
 
3.4 Summary  
In this chapter, I situated teachers’ perspectives on education reform in the 
context of the quality of their pre-service training. Overall, the results support the 
hypothesis that teacher training affects teacher opinions on education reform policies. 
Many teachers are, in fact, willing to experiment with some of these reforms and those 
who are most willing to reform education tend to come from high-quality undergraduate 
institutions of education. Specifically, teachers trained at top-tier universities are more 
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likely to support education reform concerning tenure elimination, accountability, merit 
pay, and, to some extent, charter schools compared to teachers who were trained at 
second-tier universities. Reformers who choose to target teacher quality initiatives are 
likely to find an increasing number of allies and collaborators amongst this particular 
group of teachers. 
The next chapter will build on these findings by considering that the potential 
implementation of the education reforms studied here have all been stunted, in part, by a 
lack of teachers union support and in some cases the unions’ vehement opposition. 
Chapter 4 will attempt to explain why teachers unions have taken these political positions 
that, on average, do not represent the views of teachers trained at high-quality 
universities. The misalignment between union leaders’ motives and this subset of the 
rank-and-file members’ preferences will also be considered within the context of 
teachers’ satisfaction with their union. Most teachers are at least somewhat satisfied with 
their union, but evidence suggests that members generally value the union’s traditional 
role in protecting their job, salary and benefits, over the union’s newer role in influencing 
the broader scheme of education policy through lobbying, collective bargaining, and 
other political activity. 
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4 Political Theory 
Various parties in the education debate often claim to know what teachers want 
and claim to speak on their behalf. Most of all, teachers unions say they look out for and 
protect teachers’ interests. With more than three-fourths of public school teachers 
nationwide belonging to a union, it might seem that teacher attitudes toward unions could 
be explained simply by their membership numbers (See Panel B of Table of 3). Teachers 
unions do enjoy an enormous membership base, far larger than other labor unions, 
granting them substantial organizational capacity; they certainly play a strong role in 
influencing the opinions of teachers. Yet, the Brookings Institute’s 2003 Survey of 
Educator’s reveals that the individual dispositions of members do not imply blind union 
loyalty. Public school teachers’ views on education policy are far from unanimous or 
monolithic; they are nuanced and complex. 
In fact, as my empirical work confirmed, unions’ actions frequently differ from 
the attitudes of rank-and-file teachers. There is a misalignment between teachers unions’ 
political agendas and the opinions about education policy held by their members. 
Summary statistics from the 2003 Survey of Educators indicates that individual teachers 
tend to be more favorable to education reform initiatives concerning tenure, 
accountability, and school choice than teachers unions themselves. Substantial 
proportions of individual teachers support tenure elimination in exchange for a salary 
increase (72% at some level), accountability (42%), merit pay (53% support), charter 
schools (41% support), and private school vouchers (25%)—policies that teachers union 
leaders openly denounce and lobby against (See Table 1). 
Recognizing the differences in the political agenda of teachers unions and the 
attitudes of individual teachers, the previous chapter highlighted that one possible factor 
in explaining this difference is the quality of teacher training as measured by the quality 
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of undergraduate institution attended. The union’s motives coincide fairly well with the 
preferences of teachers trained at second-tier universities who tend to oppose most 
reforms. This evidence suggests the union has chosen to represent teachers at the lower 
end of the teacher training distribution more so than teachers at the upper end of the 
distribution who likely attended top-tier universities or ivy or ivy-like institutions and 
whose opinions are frequently at odds with the unions’ motives. The theories presented 
here will offer guideposts for why this disparity between the union’s position and certain 
rank-and-file members’ views on education reform exists, and I will synthesize my 
empirical results with theory to suggest the most likely reason for this political 
incongruity. I suggest three main reasons for the misalignment: (1) the union is 
representing the majority, (2) the union is representing its most “locked-in,” reliant 
members, and (3) the union is maintaining its collective strength, at the expense of a few, 
by not distinguishing between members. Beyond this, the evidence reveals that most 
teachers value their union for its original purpose in protecting their salary and benefits, 
regardless of whether or not the union accurately represents their political beliefs. 
In order to make sense of this phenomenon, we must first understand the 
traditional role of teachers unions (4.1), how public sector unions are different from 
private sector unions (4.2), and how teachers unions have evolved over time to take on 
political agendas (4.3) before unpacking why teachers unions are not more aligned with 
their membership trained at top-tier universities, but represent the views of teachers 
trained at second-tier universities rather accurately (4.4). Following this explanation, I 
will answer two related questions— if teachers from top-tier universities do not agree 
with their union’s stance on education policy, why are they still members of the union 
and why are they satisfied with the local union in spite of the misrepresentation of their 
policy beliefs by the national union (4.5)? Finally, the implications of teachers union’s 
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position regarding education policy will be analyzed in the context of the legal battle over 
agency fees (4.6). 
 
4.1 Teachers Union Inception & Traditional Role 
The vast majority of public school teachers in the United States belong to either 
the National Education Association (NEA) or the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT)— powerful public sector unions that engage in collective bargaining, lobbying, 
and political action. Teachers rely on their local unions for due process and grievance 
procedures, information about their benefits, rights, and responsibilities, and negotiating 
contracts, salaries, and benefits on their behalf. While these unions effectively represent 
the interests of many education professionals at the local level, they have come under 
increased scrutiny as of late regarding the national structures’ role (via the NEA or AFT) 
in protecting teachers, their jobs, and their work environment at the expense of harming 
the quality of public schooling and hampering the improvement of student academic 
performance. 
Labor unionism in the public sector—including public education—is a relatively 
recent development. For the first century of taxpayer-funded public schools in the United 
States (1860-1960), teachers had no collective bargaining rights, endured poor working 
conditions, and were subjected to the vagaries of school politics, administrator bias, and 
favoritism (Murphy, 1990; Holcomb, 2006; Kahlenberg, 2012; Goldstein, 2014). 
Prior to the 1960s, it was not uncommon for the constitutional rights of teachers 
to be grossly denied. Teachers were discriminated against for their gender, race, and 
political beliefs, and could be dismissed for any reason before the passage of tenure laws. 
Fed up with being underpaid and treated like interchangeable parts in the district system, 
teachers rapidly embraced unionism as a way to influence the conditions of their 
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employment after legal changes in the 1960s and 1970s authorized collective bargaining 
in the public sector (Weisberg et al., 2009; Moe, 2011). Gregory Saltzman has produced 
some of the best quantitative research on public sector unions, and teachers unions 
specifically He finds that collective bargaining for teachers tended to be adopted earlier, 
and in stronger forms, in states that already had well-organized labor movements and in 
which Democrats had recently gained control of the governorship and the legislature 
(Saltzman, 1985). Today, we see the remnants of this pattern of unionization: all of the 
states in the Northeast, the upper Midwest, and the West Coast have public sector 
bargaining laws for teachers and twenty-two of them either require nonmembers to pay 
agency fees or, much more common, permit agency fees if they are imposed through 
local-level negotiations (Moe, 2011; Levinson, 2018). 
Starting with Wisconsin in 1959, states began passing union-friendly legislation 
that either gave teachers the right to collectively bargain or mandated that districts 
negotiate with unions in good faith. These duty-to-bargain laws made it illegal for a 
district to refuse to bargain with a union, and most of them require state arbitration if the 
two sides fail to reach an agreement. The enactment of these laws gave unions 
considerable power in the collective bargaining process and led to a sharp rise in teacher 
union membership and the prevalence of union-negotiated contracts (Murphy, 1990; 
Moe, 2011; Lovenheim & Willén, 2016). Each state has its own laws regarding public 
sector unionization and in recent years, states such as Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan, and 
Tennessee have sought to weaken the ability of teachers unions to negotiate contracts in 
K–12 education (Lovenheim & Willén, 2016). 
The first teachers unions were established to ensure decent wages, hours, and 
working conditions for teachers or what American labor leader Samuel Gompers called 
the “bread and butter” basics (Rosenberg & Silva, 2012). The role of a union is to protect 
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one’s job, salary, and benefits by ensuring due process rights and safeguarding against 
unfair treatment by employers (i.e. administrators in the case of teachers). Unions have 
the ability to influence and improve workplace conditions, pay, benefits, and job security. 
The union is a source of protection without which most teachers would be far worse off. 
As a result of unionization, educators are now able to voice their opinions and champion 
causes without fear of retaliation. 
Unions have fought against restrictive district requirements and represented 
members treated differently when they disagree with new policies or the viewpoints of 
their administrators.11 An 1885 NEA report called for legislative action to protect 
teachers from unjust dismissal, and the following year Massachusetts was the first state to 
pass a tenure law for K-12 teachers (Horn & Schaffner, 2003). Following the Great 
Depression, teachers banded together to fight for job protection and benefits, and by the 
1950s, 80 percent of all K-12 teachers were tenured (McGuinn, 2010).  
The major breakthrough in teacher unionism came in New York City in 1962 
when the United Federation of Teachers, led by Al Shanker, went on a highly-publicized 
strike and won the right to bargain for all city teachers in a new contract which set up 
uniform pay scales, seniority rights for teachers, limited hours, and required new teachers 
to be enrolled in the union automatically and have dues deducted from their paychecks 
(Stern, 1997; Moe, 2011). Since the 1960s, primarily through collective bargaining 
activity, teachers unions have consolidated their power to protect these standards and 
resist policies that threaten them. 
Today, similar to other professionals, teachers worry about the increasing cost of 
health insurance and retirement, and they rely on their union to protect those benefits. 
                                                 
11 For example, teachers in the 1930s were expected to take an anti-communist loyalty oath (Goldstein, 
2014). 
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Modern teachers unions also serve an ancillary purpose of educating and informing 
members about the decisions of the school board, district policies, and current issues 
facing the school district. Teachers unions also provide career and professional 
development resources, liability and health insurance, and legal advice and 
representation.12 Local unions are critical in providing legal defense of teachers who 
grieve being fired or who are accused of inappropriate behavior (Moe, 2011). 
 
4.2 How Public Sector Unions Differ from Private Sector Unions 
A substantial amount of literature has documented the fundamental reasons why 
public sector unions operate differently than unions in the private sector (Gregory & 
Borland, 1999; Denholm, 2001; DiSalvo, 2010; Edwards, 2010; Kowal, 2011). The 
economic downturn of 2008 rekindled anti-union sentiments, with political leaders in 
many states and local communities demanding concessions from public sector unions 
and, in some cases, seeking to curb their collective bargaining power. These summaries 
frequently argue that public sector unions ought to be subject to greater restrictions. 
Since public sector workers are funded by taxpayers and not business entities, 
their wages and benefits are not subject to market forces. If a private sector union 
demands too much from a corporation, they could push it into bankruptcy and thus 
sabotage their own objective. There are no similar checks on government worker unions. 
Furthermore, public sector workers can negotiate work rules that create inefficiency of 
government operation, without risking bankruptcy. Instead, this inefficiency leads to 
more government workers, higher taxes, and potentially greater government debt. 
Because these unions are paid for by the taxpayer and provide a public good to society, it 
                                                 
12 Union membership also comes with perks. Members are also able to benefit from several discount 
program opportunities that include life insurance benefits, credit cards with special rewards, mortgage 
assistance, and shopping discounts. 
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is generally considered unsavory for public sector unions to use tactics of private sector 
trade unions such as strikes. In some cases, it is illegal for public sector employees, 
especially those deemed critical to public safety such as police and fireman to go on 
strike. 
In addition, government workers staff the agencies that regulate and oversee 
businesses and individuals meaning they are in a unique position to use the power of the 
government to promote their own agendas and harass those who challenge them. The 
added role of a public sector union is that they care deeply about legislation which affects 
the way they conduct their activities. Politicians and bureaucrats have vested interests 
that do not necessarily lead to quality or efficiency for the public they serve. Thus, public 
sector union leaders have powerful incentives to promote policies in opposition to free 
markets and efficient resource allocation.  
 The scope of collective bargaining, duty-to-bargain laws, and union security 
provisions (that is, whether or not unions are permitted to impose agency fees on 
nonmembers if they refuse to join), as well as the specific types of public workers 
covered, varies considerably between states. These powers of public sector unions are 
currently being threatened in the Supreme Court which will be discussed in 4.6. 
 
4.3 A Changing Role for Teachers Unions 
Originally the goals of teachers unions were widely understood—uniformly better 
compensation, greater job security, and reduced workloads for their members. But, in the 
last two decades as they have gained members and consolidated power, another role of 
teachers unions has emerged: to influence education policy making. Teachers unions 
became involved in political bargaining and support candidates which they believe can 
positively affect educators and the quality of education. Some major issues that both the 
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AFT and NEA have taken strong interest in include merit pay, charter schools, and 
teacher evaluations (Malfaro; 2010; Toch, 2010;). Uniquely positioned as a public sector 
union, they have “often portrayed themselves as selfless champions as children who 
sought only to improve the quality of American education” rather than advance their own 
members’ professional interests (Coulson, 2011). In doing so, teachers unions have 
“taken up the much more challenging, amorphous, and inherently political issue of how 
we should run schools” (Coulson, 2011). 
The NEA was, for many years (1860s-1960s), controlled by conservative school 
administrators and was disdainful of the AFT, a teachers-only group founded in 1914 
(Moe, 2011). The AFT negotiated contracts with local school boards and, as it became 
more powerful, was not reluctant to threaten strikes to strengthen its demands. Following 
AFT’s success in the 1960s, the NEA has adopted union tactics and built one of most 
well-financed political action committees in the nation, wielding considerable power at 
the federal level (Coulson, 2011). The AFT, though more regional and smaller than the 
NEA, also have a well-organized political arm. In order to influence national policy and 
politics, the NEA and AFT both raise tremendous amounts of funds from their members 
which are donated to campaigns at all levels, from the local school board to the 
presidency. Of the $56 million in federal campaign contributions made by teachers 
unions over the last 20 years, 90 percent has gone to Democratic candidates which has 
led Republicans to argue these unions have raised the cost and lowered the quality of 
public education (Coulson, 2011). It is at the state and local levels, though, where the 
unions’ lobbying efforts are mainly focused since public schools are mostly funded, 
managed, and operated at these lower levels of government. Accordingly, teachers unions 
play a powerful role in influencing the direction of education policy. 
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Research shows local teachers unions have substantial sway over the elections of 
those who affect them most including state officials and school board members (Hartney 
& Flavin, 2011). In essence, many teachers unions vet and choose candidates for school 
board— the very people they will be negotiating with to decide salaries and benefits 
(Moe, 2011). Moreover, there are some instances in which school districts are not 
managed by a board but instead overseen by a chancellor appointed by an elected official 
such as the mayor. On the whole, the evidence suggests that these officials have made 
generous concessions on increased teacher salaries or pensions, at an exorbitantly high 
cost for the government (Coulson, 2011). In the best instances, these concessions were 
made in exchange for enacting reform policies.13 In the worst cases, the concessions were 
made to garner political support. 
The power of unions to block education reform has become more evident to the 
public in recent years as federal funds have prioritized the issue. Teachers unions’ 
massive campaigns to halt legislation in multiple states that would limit collective 
bargaining were well-documented in the media. Teachers union leaders have insisted that 
their labor movement goes beyond the “bread and butter” basics of salaries, benefits, and 
work rules to engage in reforms aimed at transforming the profession, improving schools, 
and consequently improving student achievement. Teachers union leaders, such as AFT 
President Randi Weingarten, have said that teachers should be involved in America’s 
contentious debates over education reform and administrators should share accountability 
for student performance, but in practice teachers unions have not strayed much from the 
original mission: to advocate on behalf of their members’ salaries, benefits, and work 
rules (Conan, 2010). 
                                                 
13 Former school chancellors Joel Klein in New York City and Michelle Rhee are prime examples. 
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It may be that unions believe school reform conversations cannot even get started 
before school administrators meet the core obligation of providing a well-functioning and 
fair workplace for teachers. Having done so, perhaps then unions could take on, in a 
meaningful way, some of the chronic problems that batter their public image, frustrate 
teachers, and have an adverse impact on students. The idea that teachers unions would 
actively support education reform, working with rather than against district and district 
management, is relatively new. In the 1980s, “new unionism,” which focused less on 
restrictive work rules and more on building cooperative relationships among teachers and 
administrative leaders, became central to the union agenda (Rosenberg & Silva, 2012, p. 
2). Still, for many teachers the union’s appropriate role should be to stand against the 
rising tide of reform; policymakers keep raising requirements on teachers and union’s 
role is to “provide a natural bulwark” against this tendency (Chait, 2011). 
Many remain skeptical of the efficacy of new unionism, claiming it is impossible 
to both protect the current system and simultaneously work to reform it. Critics of 
teachers unions, mainly Republicans, claim that unions stymie progress and that no 
meaningful education reform can succeed until unions stop demanding work rules which, 
in their view, subvert the interaction between teachers and students.14 Reform-oriented 
thinkers claim that current employment law negates the original reasons for creating a 
union and that the tenure rules, vigorously defended by teachers unions, make it unduly 
difficult, costly, and time consuming to remove ineffective teachers from the classroom 
(Koski, 2012; Edmonds, 2012; Guerrero, 2012). Moe (2011) concludes that teachers' 
unions are a key reason for the failure of American public education because they protect 
                                                 
14 Criticism of teacher union power in the 1980s was led by William J. Bennett when he was the secretary 
of education in the Reagan administration. He claimed that “almost without fail, whenever a worthwhile 
school proposal of legislative initiative is under consideration, those with a vested interest in the 
educational status quo will use political muscle to block reform” (Coulson, 2011). 
54 
 
 
ineffective teachers and more generally block education reform that could potentially 
improve schooling.  
These conclusions match others in the literature. Farkas et al. (2003) and Duffett 
et al. (2008) find that teachers are reluctant to give up tenure in order to achieve other 
educational reforms. Similarly, Goldhaber et al. (2008), West and Mykerezi (2011), and 
Hartney and Flavin (2011) find that increased teacher union political activity greatly 
reduces the chances that states enact reform-oriented education policies such as school 
choice and merit pay while Hoxby (2003) and Reid (2003) demonstrate reluctance among 
teachers unions to support charter schools, despite public support for such measures 
(Duffett et al., 2008). 
According to Moe, unions can never be a true partner in reform because through 
the work rules that union contracts impose, they advance their members special interests 
which perversely influence student performance. Consequently, the union’s purpose is to 
organize the teaching profession in a manner that will best serve teachers, not students— 
and what would be best for teachers is not necessarily always best for kids (Lovenheim & 
Willén, 2016). 
Other scholars have defended teachers unions arguing that collective bargaining 
in public education serves the public interests because “on many of the big educational 
issues—including the levels of investment in education” the interests of teachers “do 
align nicely with the interests of the children they teach” (Kahlenberg, 2012). In 
Kahlenberg’s (2012) view, teachers unions’ collective bargaining rights can raise the 
caliber of the profession and attract more qualified candidates to the teaching workforce 
who otherwise would not apply (Kahlenberg, 2012; Kahlenberg & Greene, 2012). 
Furthermore, unions have argued that the criticism against tenure is misplaced. The union 
is only ensuring due process is followed and administrators are to blame for ineffective 
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teachers as it is their responsibility as gatekeepers to the profession to take advantage of 
the pre-tenure probationary period during which teachers can be fired quite easily and 
provide more adequate professional development resources to help inexperienced 
teachers be successful in the classroom. 
 
4.4 Why Do Unions Represent Teachers Trained at Second-tier Universities? 
As detailed in 4.3, teaches unions have moved beyond their original purpose of 
protecting jobs and negotiating salaries to influence education policy which affects the 
way teachers do their job. As my empirical work revealed, teachers have disparate 
attitudes about education policies such as tenure elimination, accountability, merit pay, 
charter schools, and private school vouchers, and their views on these issues can be 
explained in part by the quality of their undergraduate training. Teachers who attended 
second-tier universities tend to not be as likely to support such reforms in comparison to 
their colleagues who graduated from top-tier universities. Since it is impossible to 
represent the views of all its teachers’ simultaneously, teachers unions must strategically 
choose which views of its membership it will represent most closely and therefore which 
views will not be represented. Evidence suggests that teachers unions have chosen to 
represent those opposed to reform (teachers who are more likely to have been trained at  a 
second-tier institution) rather than to represent those in favor of reform (teachers who are 
more likely to have been trained at a top-tier institution). 
There are several reasons this may be the case. In part, the union is simply 
following the will of the majority. The Survey of Educators reports two-thirds of teachers 
attended a second-tier university while only twenty percent attended a top-tier or ivy-like 
institution (See Table 2). Union leaders must be elected, and therefore the leadership 
must cater to the majority (or at least cannot ignore a majority of members who are united 
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on an issue). Although political realities dictate the union leadership move in the 
direction of not backing reform, there are other reasons for this decision as well. Clearly, 
unions have strategically chosen to protect their most vulnerable members who are leery 
of education reforms that draw lines between adequately performing or outstanding 
teachers and those who are ineffective in the classroom. Not surprisingly, teachers who 
are not as confident in their skills are significantly more reluctant to support policies 
which could put their job or salary at risk— such as merit pay and tenure elimination—
than their counterparts trained in higher quality undergraduate institutions. 
In contrast, graduates of top-tier universities are likely to have more job 
opportunities available to them as the high quality of their education qualifies them for a 
position in a variety of industries. Thus, top-tier university teachers feel less reliant on 
union-based protections such as tenure and are less hesitant to support education reform 
aimed at improving teacher quality. Due to this, teachers unions have chosen to represent 
the views of the subset of their membership that depends on them the most. 
Though not universally true, second-tier universities can be thought of a teacher 
certification mills which create a “locked-in” syndrome amongst their trainees. Teachers 
from these institutions have difficulty seeing themselves as anything other than a teacher. 
Thus, they perceive themselves to be “locked-in” to the profession. Being a tenured 
teacher is a large part of that identity and there is little perceived career flexibility 
because their training program is so specified that they consider themselves unqualified 
to do much else. This mindset explains why this type of teacher would value career 
security above all else. As seen in 3.3.1 thirty percent of the teachers in the Survey of 
Educators from second-tier universities would not give up tenure for even a fifty percent 
raise, as compared to just twenty-two percent of teachers from top-tier university 
graduates (See Panel A of Table 9). 
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Another possible explanation is that union leaders are adopting a trustee role (in 
contrast to a delegate form of representation) and are acting in what they believe is the 
best interest of the collective, occasionally at the expense of individual teachers. For 
instance, excellent teachers could be making substantially higher salaries under a merit 
pay system, but the union refuses to support differentiated pay systems which could 
divide teachers and undermine their collective power. The union’s refusal to support 
merit pay policies that could undoubtedly help some members perpetuates the flawed 
assumption that all accredited teachers are the same (Weisberg et al., 2009). This united 
front, however, allows the teachers union to expand its collective power and influence to 
exert itself in ways that benefit a majority of their members (though maybe at the expense 
of other members). As a public sector union, teachers union have to balance their desire 
for increased salaries against politicians’ desire not to raise taxes, while also claiming 
they have students’ best interest in mind when they set up rules for how schools are 
funded, operated, and overseen. Each side embraces a different vision of an ideal 
education system because of their vested interests in arranging the system in a way that 
benefits them most, so the union must take a more extreme position and keep its 
membership as large as possible in order to have and maintain leverage with government 
bureaucrats. 
 
4.5 Union Satisfaction 
The main result of Chapter 3 was that not all of the rank-and-file members of 
teachers unions are in complete agreement with the political agenda of union leadership, 
and their difference in beliefs is correlated with teacher training. Upon noticing this, one 
might think that a smart union would modify its message in order to stay relevant, yet this 
does not seem to be the case for teachers unions. The likely reason is that this mismatch 
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does not mean that teachers are dissatisfied with their unions. On the whole, most 
teachers are at least somewhat satisfied with their union (See Table 10).15 High union 
satisfaction rates combined with the considerable misalignment in political attitudes 
between unions and their members lends credence to the fact that, for many, joining a 
teachers union is not a politically motivated decision.  
Table 11 shows the primary reasons why teachers say they joined the union 
(Survey of Educators, 2003). Respondents were asked “Which of the following best 
describes why you are a member of the teachers organization?” with the options of: “I 
belong to support the organization’s collective bargaining activities,” “I belong to support 
the organization’s political activities (to affect elections and public policy),” “I belong to 
support both its collective bargaining and its political activities,” “I belong because other 
teachers expect me to,” “I belong mainly to get liability (and perhaps other) insurance,” 
“I belong because the union would protect me if I needed it,” “I belong because I have 
to,” or “None of these.” Protection (27%), collective bargaining and politics (21%), and 
insurance benefits (21%) are among the most popular reasons for membership, while 
political activities alone is the primary reason for joining the union for only 3.6% of 
unionized teachers surveyed. In short, teachers most value the local benefits (job 
protection and salary negotiation) guaranteed by union representation and collective 
bargaining, and likely least value national union objectives in the political arena. 
Despite some grumbling that dues are too high or work rules are too rigid, most 
teachers strongly value the traditional protections union offer. While teachers from top-
tier universities mostly appreciate and expect unions to continue playing their traditional 
role in bargaining for benefits, safeguarding jobs, and protecting teachers from the 
                                                 
15 Specifically, the Survey of Educators asked respondents who reported being a member of the union: “In 
general, how satisfied are you with the teachers organization?” 
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political machinations in their districts, they are also significantly more open and 
optimistic (in comparison to their second-tier university counterparts) to the union 
playing a role in reform or at the very least not blocking promising initiatives when they 
arise. Large percentages of these teachers support accountability and merit pay which 
would restructure the way teachers are incentivized and rewarded. Some (albeit fewer) 
even support high-stakes reform efforts such as eliminating tenure to make removing 
ineffective teachers from the classroom easier or school choice based reforms which 
could transform the public education system as we know it. 
That is not to say teachers trained at second-tier universities do not want to see 
change, but teachers from second-tier universities are more cautious of education reform 
on average. These teachers feel aligned with the union and anxious about relinquishing its 
associated protections. With reformers pushing for dramatic change and teachers unions 
holding tight to the current system, many of these teachers are caught in the middle, 
unsure of how their profession should change, but aware that it needs to. In recent years, 
education reform has moved at a ferocious pace, with many teachers feeling left out and 
left behind (Rosenberg & Silva, 2012). Teachers who feel extremely vulnerable to the 
powers that be—principals, parents, politicians—continue to be tethered to their union 
for the traditional slate of protections. But teachers who are confident in their skills 
(which is likely to be those trained at a top-tier university) are less reliant on their union 
for the basic protections and thus prefer a new unionism which goes beyond the benefits 
of local collective bargaining to transform the teaching profession. 
According to the Survey of Educators, a substantial proportion of union members 
are indeed willing to support reforms that could radically transform the profession (such 
as tenure elimination). They are just not in favor of these reforms at the expense of their 
traditional salary and benefits. In many ways, it is the second-tier university teachers who 
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experience firsthand problems that undermine their profession: job lock, too much 
bureaucracy, and weak pay structures. Under the current system, excellent work goes 
unrecognized and poor performance goes unaddressed. If unions were to rollback their 
opposition to reform, though, it would likely come at the expense of the union’s core 
mission by allowing distinctions between different kinds of teachers that would make the 
organization susceptible to loss of membership, funding, and influence. A 2011 survey 
conducted by the National Center for Education Information confirms that only 19% of 
teachers believe that “getting rid of the teachers union” would strengthen the profession; 
the vast majority of teachers still value the teachers union for its traditional role.  
Since local unions are primarily responsible for carrying out this traditional role, 
in providing job protection and negotiating salaries and benefits, and national unions are 
largely responsible for the political activity teachers tend to value less, Fenno’s paradox 
of congressional approval could be applied to this situation. Fenno’s paradox refers to the 
belief that people generally disapprove of Congress as a whole, but support the 
Congressmen from their own district. This framework has been applied in other political 
contexts such as the idea that citizens generally approve of their local public school, but 
disapprove of public education in America at large. We see teachers exhibiting beliefs 
consistent with Fenno: while teachers strongly support their local union, they look less 
favorably on the state and national unions.16 According to an Education Sector report 
(2008), 85 percent of union members say that the teachers union at the district level is 
effective; 78 percent say the union in their building is effective; 68 percent say the union 
is effective the state level; and only 57 percent say the union is effective at the national 
level (Duffett et al., 2008, p. 11). Assuming that teachers are more satisfied with the local 
                                                 
16 Fenno’s paradox is named after political scientist Richard Fenno who discussed this phenomenon in his 
1978 book Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. 
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activities of their union than by the activities of the political aims of the national union, 
these statistics make sense and suggest that most teachers, regardless of their training, are 
supportive of local union activities. 
 
4.6 The Future of Teachers Unions & Agency Fees 
This chapter has communicated that teachers unions do not accurately represent 
the political views all of their members equally, but the majority of teachers still join and 
are satisfied with their union. The implication of this finding is that some members, more 
likely those from top-tier universities, are more reluctant union members than others. 
These teachers are significantly more likely to support education reform policies that the 
union opposes, but they may still choose to be a union member because most value the 
traditional role the union plays in protecting teachers’ jobs and salaries. Thus, if the 
political activities of a union could be separated from its non-political activities, one 
would expect union membership and funding to decline as these members would opt out. 
However, collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently political. The teachers 
unions negotiate with a government entity, generally a school board representing local 
citizens. In doing so, public sector unions use collective bargaining to influence the 
amount of tax dollars spent and where those dollars are spent.  
Teachers have the right not to join the union if they choose, but in 22 states, 
nonmembers are currently required to pay “agency” fees to cover the cost of the union’s 
collective bargaining services (Levinson, 2018). The union calls these “fair share” fees 
asserting that their elimination would create a class of free riders—workers who would 
pay nothing while still enjoying the higher salaries and other benefits negotiated by 
unions. From the union’s standpoint, a legal requirement is obviously the simplest and 
most effect way of overcoming the free rider problem. However, laws requiring these 
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fees from nonmembers are currently under review by the Supreme Court in the case 
Janus v. AFSCME and if they are declared unconstitutional the education labor landscape 
could be fundamentally altered.  
Decades of litigation and Supreme Court decisions have led to the current state of 
affairs in labor laws concerning public sector employees. In 1977, the Court held 
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, that no one can be forced to join a public-sector 
union as a condition of employment. Nor can one be forced to contribute to the union’s 
political speech and activities, but they can be required to pay for collective bargaining 
and other related activities—unions are allowed to charge nonmembers a fee equivalent 
to dues to cover the costs of bargaining contracts, processing grievances, and other 
administrative activities (Levinson, 2018). Nonmembers who fee these fees do not 
receive the many benefits unions have to offer (insurance, protection, and so forth). 
Public employees who do not endorse the union’s political activities must sign a letter, 
generally once a year, asking to opt-out of the union’s political spending and then wait 
for the refund of the portion of agency fees that were spent on political activity 
(Levinson, 2018). Due to the hassle involved in opting out of the union’s political 
spending—and because agency fees can be nearly equivalent to dues—this system clearly 
encourages teachers to join the union, even if they do not endorse its political activity. 
Still others who disagree with the union’s political spending may not request a refund 
give how onerous it can be to make the request. Moe dubs this practice “legal coercion” 
(Moe, 2011, p.64). The current framework in the states which do allow agency fees puts 
the burden on employees to opt out of union political spending as opposed to putting the 
burden on unions to recruit employees to opt in. 
The newest case challenging agency fees is brought by plaintiff Mark Janus, an 
Illinois social worker covered by a collective agreement (Levinson, 2018). Janus claims 
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that the requirement that he pay fees to the union representing public sector employees, 
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) is an 
infringement on his First Amendment rights of free speech and free association because 
the union may use this money to contribute to collective bargaining activities he may 
disagree with. According to Janus’s lawyers, it is difficult or impossible to distinguish 
between spending on collective bargaining and on political activity because for public 
sector unions collective bargaining occurs with the government. If the Court rules in 
favor of Janus making compulsory fees for nonmembers illegal, teachers unions (as well 
as all other public sector unions) will find themselves bracing for a substantial reduction 
in revenues which will undoubtedly weaken their lobbying power in the political arena. 
Teachers who chose to join the union the for non-political reasons, under agency fee 
requirements, may be significantly more likely to act on their ideology and forgo union 
membership when the cost of not joining is removed. 
As Chapter 2 outlined, education policy is shaped by the relative power of 
teachers unions at any given moment. How much money is spent, on what, who is hired 
or fired, how the industry promotes effective teaching, and how educational success is 
measured are all affected by these labor realities. My research demonstrates that the 
teachers most likely to leave the union should agency fees be eliminated are teachers 
trained at high-quality undergraduate institutions because they are more likely to disagree 
with the union on education reform issues. Therefore, the ruling in Janus may open the 
door for more education reform proposals to pass as the teachers unions who oppose 
these reforms will be weakened by a loss of membership and funding. If teachers are 
more privy to what works in education (compared to reform-minded researchers and 
policymakers from the outside), an undercut to organized power in the public sector 
could be damaging to educational quality. 
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On the other hand, a ruling in favor of Janus may galvanize public sector unions, 
faced with a shrinking revenue stream, to actively explain the benefits of union 
membership in order to convince public employees the union is worthy of their support. 
Besides, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, unions fare well in “right-to-work” 
states, where private-sector workers have the right to choose whether or not to pay union 
dues (Kovacs, 2018). Data compiled by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy show 
union membership rates in those states are comparable to states that require forced union 
dues (Kovacs, 2018). 
 
4.7 Summary 
Teachers unions have evolved over time to take on political agendas that not all 
portions of their membership agree with. In particular, teachers who were trained at a top-
tier university are more likely to be in favor of education reforms, and therefore, at odds 
with the union, than teachers who were trained at a second-tier university. There are 
several reasons why the union has chosen to represent the policy views of teachers 
trained at second-tier universities most accurately, while not representing the policy 
views of top-tier university teachers: the union is catering to the majority, the union is 
protecting its most vulnerable members, and the union is preserving its collective 
strength, at minimal expense to a few, in order to help all teachers. Moreover, evidence 
from the Survey of Educators demonstrates that even teachers who are opposed to the 
national union’s political motives are quite satisfied with the local union’s negotiation of 
salary and benefits. In the era of increased scrutiny of public sector unions, legal rulings 
could weaken union’s political power via reducing their funding and membership, 
therefore making the passage of education reforms the union opposes a greater 
possibility. 
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5 Conclusion 
The motivation for this paper was to uncover the relationship between the quality 
of a teacher’s training (as measured by the quality of their undergraduate college or 
university) in predicting his or her attitudes about education reform policies. Through the 
course of this empirical research an anomaly was uncovered: teachers unions are not fully 
aligned with the views of their rank-and-file membership. Particularly, teachers unions do 
not reflect the policy beliefs of the distribution of their membership drawn from top-tier 
universities. Teachers unions have taken this policy stance in order to cater to the 
majority, protect their most reliant members’ interests, and maintain their collective 
power. Substantial percentages of teachers from all training backgrounds are more 
willing to support reform than union political activity suggests, but a dichotomy exists— 
lines are drawn based on the quality of the teachers’ undergraduate training with teachers 
trained at top-tier universities significantly more likely to support education reform 
proposals the union opposes such as tenure elimination, accountability for student 
outcomes, and merit pay, over their counterparts who were trained at second-tier 
universities.  
There are several reasons why we might see this divergence in attitudes between 
teachers trained at top-tier universities and teachers trained at second-tier universities. 
Teachers who attended a high quality undergraduate institution are less dependent on job 
protections because they are likely to have a diverse array of job opportunities available 
to them. In addition, they are more likely to be confident in their teaching skills and 
anticipate that they would retain their job in a system without tenure and benefit from a 
merit pay scale in comparison to graduates of second-tier universities who are less 
confident in their abilities and more likely to prefer the union-protected status quo than 
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potentially put their job or salary at risk in order to adopt the education reform proposals 
examined. 
Another reason for this divergence in attitudes between teachers trained at top-tier 
universities and teachers trained at second-tier universities that was not explored thus far 
is that teacher training itself is political. While colleges of education at second-tier 
universities are more likely to focus on the essentials of teaching such as classroom 
management and earning a satisfactory evaluation, colleges of education at top-tier 
universities are more likely seeking to produce teachers who will be change-agents for 
social justice in the field of education who hope to transform the system to end the 
achievement gap and serve all students better. The different teaching philosophies 
enforced at these institutions influence how their graduating teachers view the school 
system and its goals, including their broader perspective on education reform. 
Teachers from second-tier universities may also wish to see change– both in the 
teaching profession and in the role of the union, but they are skeptical of education 
reforms which would substantially change the way teachers could be dismissed or 
compensated. Their training environment did not emphasize a need for change or risk-
taking, and giving up the job and salaries protections unions have long defended makes 
these teachers trained at second-tier universities understandably anxious. Thus, teachers 
unions have aligned their political agenda most closely to represent the preferences of 
these more vulnerable members of their rank-and-file as opposed to teachers trained at 
high-quality top-tier universities whose opinions frequently diverge from union 
leadership. Still, local unions enjoy high approval ratings from second-tier university 
trained teachers and top-tier university trained teachers alike, so the national union has 
little incentive to cater to the policy preferences of the minority of its membership that 
attended a top-tier university since these teachers continue to value the union for its 
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traditional purpose in protecting jobs, negotiating salaries and benefits, and demanding 
reasonable working conditions. 
These conclusions demonstrate that the education reform movement is not sharply 
defined with two distinct sides necessarily opposed to each other—reformers versus 
teachers unions—as it is often portrayed. Rather, support for education reform is 
multifaceted and unable to be predicted based purely on ideological or union membership 
lines. Teachers can, and regularly do, draw distinctions between different kinds of 
reform. The Survey of Educators indicates that teachers are not simply for or against the 
entire slate of proposals pushed by reformers. There is a notable gap between teacher 
support for tenure elimination, accountability, and merit pay and teacher support for 
charter schools and private school vouchers, which are far less popular than the first set 
of reforms. In fact, the divergence in attitudes between teachers trained at top-tier 
universities and second-tier universities fades away when choice-based reforms are 
considered. Top-tier university teachers are not statistically significantly more likely to 
support these two reforms in comparison to teachers trained at second-tier universities.  
This qualification is an important one that reveals a path forward for reformers. 
Reformers ought to narrow the scope of their demands to policies aimed at improving 
teacher quality such as tenure reform and merit pay which the majority of public school 
teachers support and drop less popular choice-based reforms such as charter schools and 
private school vouchers from their policy docket. Not only would this approach move 
reformers closer to representing teachers’ true attitudes about education reform, but it 
would also substantially increase the possibility that teachers unions could be partners in 
reform efforts instead of barriers. 
As Chapters 2 and 4 described, education reform is not achievable without union 
support or at least the absence of union opposition. This study has found that while most 
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teachers are supportive of certain reforms, they also value their union especially at the 
local level. Since school choice reforms (e.g. charter schools and private school 
vouchers) are inherently antithetical to teachers unions’ existence, it is critical that 
reformers who strongly believe in the ability of tenure elimination, accountability, and 
merit pay to improve education distinguish themselves from reformers who are ostensibly 
opposed to the teachers unions playing any role and are, in fact, focused on reforms that 
would destroy the union.17 In doing so, the likelihood that sensible reforms, which are 
widely supported by teachers, could pass without considerable objections from teachers 
unions is greatly increased. 
Since many teachers are supportive of both education reform and their union, a 
more nuanced reform strategy is necessary. As the most powerful political advocacy 
group in the education policy arena, teachers unions should be included in reform 
discussions and not misunderstood as natural adversaries to educational reform progress. 
Teachers unions may become more open to reform and more willing to listen to their 
membership to restructure themselves to take on a more vigorous school reform agenda, 
especially with mounting federal pressure to make sweeping education reform a national 
priority. While teachers value their local unions most for their traditional protections, 
sizeable proportions of teachers are also supportive of education reforms the national 
union currently opposes. Considering teachers hold these seemingly conflicting 
viewpoints concurrently reveals that they, unlike most reformers, do not see the union as 
an enemy of education reform. Instead, many teachers would likely support their union’s 
involvement in reform efforts. 
                                                 
17 Only a tiny fraction of charter schools and private schools are unionized (Ravitch, 2013). Therefore, 
reforms that would expand the number of students and teachers in these types of schools would inevitably 
reduce the total number of unionized teachers and consequently reduce teachers unions’ funding and 
political clout. 
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This research provides critical insight into the future of the teaching profession 
and the relationship between salary incentives, job security, and school reform. As 
teacher quality and “effectiveness” debates continue to dominate education reform circles 
as well as the political arena, more scholarly research is needed to examine the efficacy 
of reforms where they have been implemented and educators’ own feedback about how 
these reforms affect their classrooms. Future research is also necessary to fully make 
sense of the complex and nuanced relationship between the quality of teacher training 
and teacher support for education reform. When more recent data becomes available, this 
study should be updated and expanded to consider new developments in teaches attitudes 
about reform as well as a potential evolution in the policy positions of teachers unions. 
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Table 1: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Teacher Support for Tenure Elimination in Exchange for a Salary Increase 
Supports elimination of tenure for a Frequency Percent 
20% salary increase 1,310 49.4% 
30% salary increase 198 7.5% 
40% salary increase 160 6.0% 
50% salary increase 237 8.9% 
Never support 746 28.1% 
Total 2,651 100% 
 
Panel B: Teacher Support for Accountability 
 Frequency Percent 
Support 1,225 41.7% 
Oppose 1,714 58.3% 
Total 2,939 100% 
 
Panel C: Teacher Support for Merit Pay 
 Frequency Percent 
Support 1,741 53.3% 
Oppose 1,523 46.7% 
Total 3,264 100% 
 
Panel D: Teacher Support for Charter Schools 
 Frequency Percent 
Support 1,165 41.3% 
Oppose 1,659 58.8% 
Total 2,824 100% 
 
Panel E: Teacher Support for Private School Vouchers 
 Frequency Percent 
Support 752 25.1% 
Oppose 2,243 74.9% 
Total 2,995 100% 
 
Table 2: College Type 
Type of College Attended Frequency Percent 
Second-tier University 2,091 67.3% 
Top-tier University 456 14.7% 
Second-tier Liberal Arts College 246 7.9% 
Top-tier Liberal Arts College 124 4.0% 
Ivy or Ivy-like University 190 6.1% 
Total 3,107 100% 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
 Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Panel A: Personal Characteristics 
Male 3,264 .273     .445 0 1 
Female 3,264 .726 .445 0 1 
White 3,123 .920 .269         0 1 
Black 3,123 .028 .167          0 1 
Hispanic 3,123 .022 .148           0 1 
Other Race 3,123 .027 .164         0 1 
Married 3,264 .549 .497         0 1 
Unmarried 3,264 .450 .497 0 1 
Income Under $50,000 3,264 .282 .450         0 1 
Income $50,000 to $99,999 3,264 .466 .498         0 1 
Income Over $100,000 3,264 .144 .351         0 1 
Republican 3,264 .322    .467           0 1 
Democrat 3,264 .408 .491         0 1 
Independent 3,264 .257 .437        0 1 
Other Political Party 3,264 .011 .107          0 1 
Self-described Risk Taker 3,264 .618 .486 0 1 
Self-described Risk Avoider 3,264 .382 .486         0 1 
Panel B: Job & School Characteristics 
Years of Experience Teaching 3,264 17.094 10.448          0 45 
Union Member 3,255 .818 .385          0 1 
Non-Union Member 3,255 .181 .385 0 1 
Inner City School 3,264 .116 .320         0 1 
Urban School 3,264 .171 .377          0 1 
Suburban School 3,264 .303 .460         0 1 
Small Town School 3,264 .245 .430         0 1 
Rural School 3,264 .162 .369         0 1 
Teaches Elementary School 3,264 .359 .479          0 1 
Teaches Middle School 3,264 .229 .420          0 1 
Teaches High School 3,264 .322 .467          0 1 
Teaches Mixed Grade Levels 3,264 .089 .285         0 1 
Panel C: College Characteristics 
SAT 25th percentile 2,869 969.3 109.1     492 1,370 
Public University 3,107 .761 .426          0 1 
Percent of Students In-state 3,088 81.2     23.6         0 100 
Percent of Students Full-pay 2,357 25.7    14.0         0 72 
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Table 4: Tenure Elimination Results 
Dependent Variable Teacher Support for Tenure Elimination  
in Exchange for a Salary Increase 
Estimation Technique Ordered logit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coeff s.e. coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Personal Characteristics 
Female .344** (.089) .379** (.091) .431** (.108) 
Black -.312 (.214) -.237 (.222) -.431 (.294) 
Hispanic -.111 (.260) -.132 (.274) -.037 (.353) 
Other Race -.192 (.236) -.155 (.246) -.286 (.294) 
Married -.041 (.083) -.0186 (.085) -.032 (.005) 
Income Under $50,000 .142 (.095) .156 (.098) .154 (.117) 
Income Over $100,000 -.012 (.112) -.065 (.115) -.058 (.136) 
Democrat -.409** (.093) -.398** (.094) -.370** (.113) 
Independent -.038 (.104) -.029 (.106) -.110 (.126) 
Other Political Party -.796* (.373) -.905* (.378) -.571 (.434) 
Risk Averse -.122 (.080) -.099 (.082) -.125 (.098) 
Job & School Characteristics 
Years of Experience Teaching -.036** (.004) -.035** (.003) -.032** (.005) 
Union Member -.978** (.111) -1.008** (.116) -1.091** (.142) 
Inner City School .028 (.133) -.004 (.136) -.054 (.165) 
Urban School .147 (.119) .132 (.121) .232 (.145) 
Small Town School .023 (.106) .009 (.108) .228 (.128) 
Rural School .031 (.121) .043 (.124) .207 (.149) 
Teaches Middle School .010 (.105) .022 (.107) -.009 (.127) 
Teaches High School .013 (.097) -.024 (.099) .127 (.118) 
Teaches Mixed Grade Levels .0156 (.150) .020 (.155) -.121 (.185) 
College Types 
Top-tier University - - .372** (.117) - - 
Second-tier Liberal Arts College - - .079 (.147) - - 
Top-tier Liberal Arts College - - .272 (.225) - - 
Ivy or Ivy-like University - - .357* (.168) - - 
College Characteristics 
SAT 25th Percentile - - - - .001** (.000) 
Public University - - - - -.145 (.359) 
Percent Cohort In-state - - - - .001 (.002) 
Percent Cohort Full-pay - - - - .003 (.003) 
Ancillary Parameters 
Cut 1 -2.410 (.193) -2.320 (.201) -1.074 (.693) 
Cut 2 -1.955 (.191) -1.859 (.199) -.592 (.692) 
Cut 3 -1.678 (.190) -1.576 (.198) -.293 (.692) 
Cut 4 -1.339 (.189) -1.241 (.197) .033 (.692) 
Number of observations 2,530 2,417 1,717 
Pseudo R2 .046 .049 .048 
Notes:  The tenure elimination variable increases in magnitude with a teacher’s willingness to 
give up tenure. The tenure elimination variable decreases in magnitude with a teacher’s desire to 
protect tenure. 
*,** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Accountability Results 
Dependent Variable Teacher Support for Accountability  
for Student Performance 
Estimation Technique Marginal Effects from Logit Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coeff s.e. coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Personal Characteristics 
Female -.016 (.022) -.022 (.023) -.040 (.027) 
Black -.005 (.056) .024 (.059) .094 (.075) 
Hispanic .031 (.064) .070 (.068) .157 (.093) 
Other Race -.018 (.055) -.003 (.057) .010 (.070) 
Married -.015 (.020) -.015 (.021) -.012 (.025) 
Income Under $50,000 .019 (.023) .026 (.024) .034 (.029) 
Income Over $100,000 .062* (.029) .063* (.029) .063 (.035) 
Democrat -.041 (.022) -.045* (.023) -.055* (.028) 
Independent -.021 (.025) -.028 (.026) -.019 (.031) 
Other Political Party -.210* (.070) -.206** (.071) -.154 (.093) 
Risk Averse -.072** (.019) -.071** (.020) -.067** (.024) 
Job & School Characteristics 
Years of Experience Teaching .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.000 (.001) 
Union Member -.116** (.025) -.108** (.026) -.078* (.032) 
Inner City School .071* (.034) .056 (.034) .074 (.043) 
Urban School .014 (.029) .008 (.030) .012 (.036) 
Small Town School .029 (.026) .029 (.027) .048 (.032) 
Rural School .062* (.030) .054 (.031) .087* (.037) 
Teaches Middle School -.030 (.025) -.031 (.026) -.012 (.031) 
Teaches High School -.024 (.023) -.029 (.024) -.011 (.029) 
Teaches Mixed Grade Levels -.071* (.034) -.073* (.036) -.063 (.043) 
College Types 
Top-tier University - - .079** (.028) - - 
Second-tier Liberal Arts College - - .042 (.037) - - 
Top-tier Liberal Arts College - - .001 (.050) - - 
Ivy or Ivy-like University - - .075 (.042) - - 
College Characteristics 
SAT 25th percentile - - - - .000 (.000) 
Public University - - - - -.040 (.099) 
Percent Cohort In-state - - - - .000 (.000) 
Percent Cohort Full-pay - - - - .001 (.001) 
Constant .255 (.182) .175 (.189) -.724 (.718) 
Number of observations 2,805 2,677 1,877 
Pseudo R2 .016 .018 .017 
Notes:  A value of 1 indicates support for the accountability variable. 
*,** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6: Merit Pay Results 
Dependent Variable Teacher Support for Merit Pay 
Estimation Technique Marginal Effects from Logit Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coeff s.e. coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Personal Characteristics 
Female .011 (.022) .015 (.022) .029 (.026) 
Black -.010 (.056) .009 (.057) .026 (.073) 
Hispanic -.052 (.063) -.055 (.066) -.119 (.087) 
Other Race -.001 (.057) .019 (.058) -.023 (.071) 
Married .018 (.020) .016 (.020) .031 (.024) 
Income Under $50,000 .021 (.023) .020 (.023) .019 (.028) 
Income Over $100,000 -.013 (.027) -.015 (.028) .008 (.033) 
Democrat -.025 (.022) -.028 (.022) -.060 (.027) 
Independent .045 (.024) .034 (.025) .014 (.030) 
Other Political Party .016 (.089) .001 (.091) .015 (.110) 
Risk Averse -.064** (.019) -.064** (.019) -.058** (.023) 
Job & School Characteristics 
Years of Experience Teaching -.008** (.001) -.008** (.001) -.007** (.001) 
Union Member -.142** (.023) -.128** (.024) -.114** (.030) 
Inner City School -.001 (.032) .002 (.033) .048 (.040) 
Urban School .004 (.028) -.001 (.028) .012 (.034) 
Small Town School -.006 (.025) -.007 (.026) .019 (.031) 
Rural School .008 (.029) .006 (.029) .055 (.035) 
Teaches Middle School .045 (.024) .049* (.025) .038 (.030) 
Teaches High School .080** (.023) .078** (.023) .084** (.028) 
Teaches Mixed Grade Levels .089** (.034) .095** (.034) .103** (.042) 
College Types 
Top-tier University - - .065* (.026) - - 
Second-tier Liberal Arts College - - -.037 (.035) - - 
Top-tier Liberal Arts College - - -.008 (.048) - - 
Ivy or Ivy-like University - - .069 (.038) - - 
College Characteristics 
SAT 25th percentile - - - - .000* (.000) 
Public University - - - - -.148 (.088) 
Percent Cohort In-state - - - - -.000 (.000) 
Percent Cohort Full-pay - - - - .001 (.001) 
Constant 1.02 (.179) .917 (.185) .376 (.702) 
Number of observations 3,114 2,973 2,092 
Pseudo R2 .042 .043 .041 
Notes:  A value of 1 indicates support for the merit pay variable. 
*,** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7: Charter Schools Results 
Dependent Variable Teacher Support for Charter Schools 
Estimation Technique Marginal Effects from Logit Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coeff s.e. coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Personal Characteristics 
Female -.017 (.023) -.018 (.023) .000 (.028) 
Black .142* (.062) .159** (.064) .206 (.081) 
Hispanic .061 (.069) .052 (.071) .057 (.097) 
Other Race -.013 (.060) -.027 (.061) -.064 (.074) 
Married -.054** (.022) -.061** (.022) -.062* (.026) 
Income Under $50,000 .028 (.025) .017 (.025) .014 (.031) 
Income Over $100,000 .030 (.030) .038 (.030) .033 (.036) 
Democrat -.167** (.023) -.170** (.023) -.200** (.027) 
Independent -.071** (.025) -.070** (.025) -.091** (.030) 
Other Political Party .069 (.097) .095 (.099) .151 (.118) 
Risk Averse -.047* (.021) -.043* (.021) -.031 (.025) 
Job & School Characteristics 
Years of Experience Teaching -.009** (.001) -.009** (.001) -.008** (.001) 
Union Member -.207** (.026) -.220** (.027) -.220** (.033) 
Inner City School .018 (.035) .016 (.035) .014 (.043) 
Urban School .061* (.031) .060* (.031) .097* (.038) 
Small Town School .034 (.028) .028 (.028) .017 (.034) 
Rural School -.056 (.030) -.057 (.031) -.052 (.037) 
Teaches Middle School .052 (.027) .047     (.028) .058 (.034) 
Teaches High School .041 (.025) .042    (.026) .082** (.031) 
Teaches Mixed Grade Levels .064 (.039) .060 (.040) .133** (.049) 
College Types 
Top-tier University - - .042     (.029) - - 
Second-tier Liberal Arts College - - .001 (.038) - - 
Top-tier Liberal Arts College - - -.001   (.052) - - 
Ivy or Ivy-like University - - .005 (.042) - - 
College Characteristics 
SAT 25th percentile - - - - .000 (.000) 
Public University - - - - .095 (.095) 
Percent Cohort In-state - - - - .001 (.001) 
Percent Cohort Full-pay - - - - .001 (.001) 
Constant 1.289  (.197) 1.367 (.205) .090 (.795) 
Number of observations 2,696 2,578 1,815 
Pseudo R2 .080 .085 .090 
Notes:  A value of 1 indicates support for the charter school variable. 
*,** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 8: Private School Vouchers Results 
Dependent Variable Teacher Support for Private School Vouchers 
Estimation Technique Marginal Effects from Logit Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coeff s.e. coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Personal Characteristics 
Female -.022 (.019) -.026 (.019) -.032 (.022) 
Black .160** (.060) .181** (.062) .193** (.079) 
Hispanic .051 (.059) .043 (.061) -.045 (.066) 
Other Race -.006 (.046) -.019 (.046) -.023 (.054) 
Married -.025 (.017) -.033 (.018) -.042* (.020) 
Income Under $50,000 .038 (.020) .030 (.020) .040 (.024) 
Income Over $100,000 -.033 (.023) -.029 (.023) -.019 (.027) 
Democrat -.218 (.017) -.221** (.017) -.210** (.020) 
Independent -.106 (.016) -.104** (.016) -.121** (.018) 
Other Political Party -.121 (.042) -.112** (.044) -.083 (.054) 
Risk Averse -.035 (.016) -.039* (.016) -.038 (.019) 
Job & School Characteristics 
Years of Experience Teaching -.004** (.001) -.004** (.001) -.002* (.001) 
Union Member -.134** (.024) -.132** (.024) -.111** (.029) 
Inner City School .013 (.029) .009 (.029) .003 (.034) 
Urban School .007 (.025) .010 (.025) .022 (.029) 
Small Town School .021 (.022) .014 (.023) .007 (.026) 
Rural School -.023 (.024) -.025 (.024) -.024 (.028) 
Teaches Middle School .046* (.023) .046* (.024) .058* (.028) 
Teaches High School .047* (.021) .046* (.022) .075** (.026) 
Teaches Mixed Grade Levels .076* (.035) .063 (.035) .075 (.043) 
College Types 
Top-tier University - - -.028 (.022) - - 
Second-tier Liberal Arts College - - .018 (.031) - - 
Top-tier Liberal Arts College - - -.035 (.040) - - 
Ivy or Ivy-like University - - .001 (.033) - - 
College Characteristics 
SAT 25th percentile - - - - -.000 (.000) 
Public University - - - - -.026 (.088) 
Percent Cohort In-state - - - - .001 (.000) 
Percent Cohort Full-pay - - - - .000 (.001) 
Constant .448 (.209) .538 (.218) .470 (.873) 
Number of observations 2,857 2,735 1,936 
Pseudo R2 .093 .095 .091 
Notes:  A value of 1 indicates support for the private school voucher variable. 
*,** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 9: Comparative Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics (Top-tier vs. Second-tier) 
 
Panel A: Teacher Support for Tenure Elimination in Exchange for a Salary Increase 
Trained at Top- tier Universities Second-tier Universities 
Supports elimination of tenure for a Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
20% salary increase 211 57.2% 805 46.7% 
30% salary increase 19 5.2% 139 8.1% 
40% salary increase 20 5.4% 100 5.8% 
50% salary increase  36 9.8% 159 9.2% 
Never supports 83 22.5% 520 30.2% 
Total 369 100% 1,723 100% 
 
Panel B: Teacher Support for Accountability 
Trained at Top-tier University Second-tier University 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Support 196 47.8% 752 39.8% 
Oppose 214 52.2% 1,139 60.2% 
Total 410 100% 1,891 100% 
 
Panel C: Teacher Support for Merit Pay 
Trained at Top-tier University Second-tier University 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Support 269 59.0% 1,073 51.3% 
Oppose 187 41.0% 1,018 48.7% 
Total 456 100% 2,091 100% 
 
Panel D: Teacher Support for Charter Schools 
Trained at Top-tier University Second-tier University 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Support 183 45.5% 721 40.1% 
Oppose 219 54.5% 1,076 59.9% 
Total 402 100% 1,797 100% 
 
Panel E: Teacher Support for Private School Vouchers 
Trained at Top-tier University Second-tier University 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Support 95 22.8% 488 25.3% 
Oppose 322 77.2% 1,444 74.7% 
Total 417 100% 1,932 100% 
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Table 10: Teachers Union Satisfaction 
 Frequency Percent 
Very dissatisfied 222 8.4% 
Somewhat dissatisfied 381 14.4% 
Somewhat satisfied 1,066 40.4% 
Very satisfied  970 36.8% 
Total 2,939 100% 
 
Table 11: Reasons for Joining the Teachers Union 
 Frequency Percent 
To support collective bargaining activities 434 16.3% 
To support political activities 97 3.6% 
Both collective bargaining and political activities 562 21.1% 
Other teachers expect me to 42 1.6% 
To get liability (and perhaps other) insurance 563 21.1% 
Union protection if I needed it 727 27.3% 
Have to 151 5.7% 
None of these 87 3.3% 
Total 2,663 100% 
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